Legality and Effectiveness of the DPR's Aspiration Network System under Administrative Law

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Abstract

The public aspiration management system within Indonesia's House of Representatives (DPR) operates without a clear framework rooted in administrative law, resulting in procedural ambiguity, weak institutional accountability, and limited meaningful public participation. The aim of this study is to analyze the normative and institutional shortcomings of the House of Representatives' consultation system; consequently, it seeks to contribute by proposing a conceptual framework grounded in administrative law. *Employing normative legal research with a conceptual and statutory approach, this study also draws on a qualitative analysis of institutional documents and academic literature. The findings revealed the absence of standardized regulations governing aspiration procedures, which rendered the system discretionary and resistant to objective evaluation. Aspirations are treated as political functions rather than administrative obligations, undermining the legitimacy of legislative representation. The study recommends institutional and regulatory reforms, including the development of standard operating procedures, a digital aspiration tracking system, and the integration of accountability principles into legislative ethical codes. These findings not only expose institutional deficiencies but also reconceptualize the DPR's aspiration system within the framework of administrative law. A key theoretical contribution lies in extending the scope of administrative law beyond the executive branch to legislative institutions, particularly in the governance of public participation. Public aspirations are reframed as administrative rights and forms of public service rather than merely political functions. The introduction of a "limited administrative embedding" model provides a structured approach to integrating administrative principles into legislative functions without diminishing their political character.*

Keywords: *Administrative Law, Parliament, Public Aspiration, Participation, Legislative Accountability.*

Introduction

Modern representative democratic systems place legislative institutions, such as the House of Representatives (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat/DPR), in a position to perform two primary functions: formulating regulations that reflect public interest and overseeing the implementation of policies by executive bodies.[1] This representative function is not merely symbolic; rather, it should be realized through concrete mechanisms, one of which is an effective system for collecting and managing public aspirations. The effectiveness of these functions is also influenced by the internal political structure of the legislature, particularly the recruitment and cadre system of members of parliament, which may affect the quality of representation and responsiveness to public aspirations.[2] Public aspirations serve as a crucial instrument for linking citizens' needs to state policies, thereby bridging the gap between society and state institutions.[3] Consequently, the existence and quality of public aspiration networking systems administered by the DPR indicate the extent to which the legislative body fulfills its constitutional role in an accountable and democratic way.[4]

Nevertheless, the practical implementation of public aspiration systems within the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) continues to face several challenges.[5] Although formal channels are available, both conventional mechanisms,

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[1] Frank Feulner, "The Indonesian House of Representatives and its Role during Democratic Regression," *The Theory and Practice of Legislation* 12, no. 2 (May 3, 2024): 229–51, https://doi.org/10.1080/20508840.2024.2351763.

[2] Muhammad Mutawalli Mukhlis et al., "Ius Constituendum Regulates the Cadre-Based Recruitment of Candidates for Members of the House of Representatives Through Political Parties," *Volksgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum dan Konstitusi*, June 24, 2024, 139–55, https://doi.org/10.24090/volksgeist.v7i1.10830.

[3] Matthew Flinders, "Bridging the Gap: Revitalising Politics and the Politics of Public Expectations," *Representation* 45, no. 3 (September 2009): 337–47, https://doi.org/10.1080/00344890903129632.

[4] Pesta Evaria Simbolon et al., "Professionalism of Expert Staff in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) from a Public Policy Perspective," 2025, 335–58, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-96-6432-0_26.

[5] Evi Noviawati, Hernadi Affandi, and Eman Suparman, "Public Participation in Lawmaking in the Digital Age: Insights from Indonesia," *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, September 2025, 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2025.2564482.

such as recess activities, and digital platforms, such as the Legislative Information System (*Sistem Informasi Legislasi/Sileg*) and the official website (dpr.go.id), the effectiveness of these systems remains suboptimal. While public participation has been normatively recognized in various regulatory instruments,[6] including Law No. 13 of 2022 on the Formation of Laws and Regulations, the technical implementation of the principle of meaningful participation remains inadequate.[7] Aspirations submitted through digital channels are not always systematically documented and are often not fully integrated into legislative or budgeting processes. There is no comprehensive tracking mechanism, feedback system, or evaluative indicator capable of ensuring that public aspirations are addressed in a procedurally and substantively meaningful manner.

This phenomenon reflects a regulatory vacuum within administrative law regarding the specific governance principles of legislative public aspiration management. Within the framework of administrative law, public institutions are expected to adhere to the principles of legality, accountability, and citizen rights–based public service. The absence of procedural standards and a coherent normative framework governing the DPR's aspiration system not only weakens legislative accountability but also exacerbates the participatory gap between society and the state authorities.[8] Consequently, public participation becomes elitist, formalistic, and often merely symbolic. The public participation channels provided by the DPR

[6] Siti Hasanah and Firzhal Arzhi Jiwantara, "Non-Formal Legitimacy of Constitutional Change and Public Perception in The Reform of the 1945 Constitution Through Constitutional Court Decisions," *Jurnal IUS Kajian Hukum Dan Keadilan* 13, no. 3 (December 28, 2025): 621–37, https://doi.org/10.29303/ius.v13i3.1841.

[7] R. Wahjoe Poernomo Soeprapto, "Meaningful Participation Through Online Channels in Legislation Making in Indonesia via Dpr.Go.Id Page," *Trunojoyo Law Review* 6, no. 2 (September 2024): 189–210, https://doi.org/10.21107/tlr.v6i2.25960.

[8] Dawid Friedrich, "Democratic Aspiration Meets Political Reality: Participation of Organized Civil Society in Selected European Policy Processes," in *Civil Society Participation in European and Global Governance* (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2008), 140–65, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230592506_7.

remain limited, insufficiently inclusive, and fail to embody deliberative principles in the law-making process, as shown below.[9]

These issues generate significant social and ethical consequences. When public aspiration systems are not managed in an open and accountable manner, the legitimacy of the DPR's representative function as a people's institution is undermined. Public aspirations that go unheard or are inadequately addressed foster distrust, which, in the long term, can weaken democratic stability and widen the gap between the state and its citizens.[10] The limited management of online participation within the legislative system further indicates that the fulfillment of participatory rights remains contingent upon technocratic institutional interpretations rather than being firmly grounded in administrative law principles that prioritize institutional accountability.[11]

Against this background, this study aims to critically examine the management of the DPR's public aspiration network from an administrative law perspective. The analysis focuses on identifying regulatory and institutional weaknesses in the governance of public aspirations, as well as on formulating a conceptual model that positions the DPR's aspiration system as an integral component of legally grounded, transparent, and accountable legislative public services. Employing a normative–empirical approach, this study analyzes the existing legal framework, compares institutional practices across selected jurisdictions, and qualitatively examines official DPR documents alongside inputs from administrative law experts.

This study offers a significant scholarly contribution, particularly by extending the scope of administrative law to the representative functions of legislative institutions. To date, administrative law scholarship in Indonesia has predominantly

[9] Dodi Jaya Wardana, Sukardi Sukardi, and Radian Salman, "Public Participation in the Law-Making Process in Indonesia," *Jurnal Media Hukum* 30, no. 1 (March 2023): 66–77, https://doi.org/10.18196/jmh.v30i1.14813.
[10] Anna Lührmann, "Disrupting the Autocratization Sequence: Towards Democratic Resilience," *Democratization* 28, no. 5 (July 2021): 1017–39, https://doi.org/10.1080/13510347.2021.1928080.
[11] Chiara Armeni and Maria Lee, "Participation in a Time of Climate Crisis," *Journal of Law and Society* 48, no. 4 (December 10, 2021): 549–72, https://doi.org/10.1111/jols.12320.

focused on the executive branch and bureaucratic processes, while the legislative function has received limited attention from the perspective of administrative responsibility and public service governance. This study does not seek to transform the DPR into a fully administrative institution. Instead, it proposes a limited administrative embedding approach, whereby specific aspects of public aspiration management are subjected to minimum administrative standards without altering the political nature of the DPR.

Recent studies have examined public participation in Indonesia's legislative process from various perspectives. Rocky and Izzah highlight the development of meaningful participation through digital platforms, particularly via the DPR's official website, yet find a gap between normative frameworks and technical implementation.[12] Hatta, meanwhile, demonstrates that public participation in the formation of the National Capital Law remains largely procedural and fails to meet substantive democratic standards.[13] Similarly, Wardana and Bachtiar emphasize the importance of public participation in law-making but reveal limitations in available participatory channels and their effectiveness.[14] However, these studies predominantly approach participation from political, procedural, or technological perspectives, without situating public aspiration management within a structured administrative law framework or addressing the need for institutional standardization within the DPR.

Against this backdrop, the novelty of this study lies in proposing a realistic, incremental model of administrative standardization that accounts for institutional

[12] Rocky Huzaen Mohamad Roky Huzaeni and Izzah Qotrun Nada, "Public Participation Reconstruction in Legislation Formation in Indonesia Post-Pandemic," *The Sunan Ampel Review of Political and Social Sciences* 2, no. 1 (December 19, 2022): 46–61, https://doi.org/10.15642/sarpass.2022.2.1.46-61.

[13] Moh. Hatta, "Public Participation in the Process of Forming Law No. 3 of 2022 Concerning the National Capital," *International Journal of Law Dynamics Review* 1, no. 2 (November 2023): 104–12, https://doi.org/10.62039/ijldr.v1i2.8.

[14] Dodi Jaya Wardana and Hasnan Bachtiar, "Public Participation in the Law-Making in the Digitalization Era," *Indonesia Law Reform Journal* 2, no. 3 (December 2022): 289–98, https://doi.org/10.22219/ilrej.v2i3.23764.

constraints such as political turnover, legislative capacity, and the electoral nature of representation. This study not only extends the application of administrative law to legislative institutions but also reconceptualizes public aspirations as administrative rights and public services requiring procedural accountability. The findings are expected to serve as a reference for institutional reform within the DPR, while also providing a conceptual and normative foundation for the formulation of explicit regulations governing the aspiration system in a manner oriented toward accountable, service-based public governance.

In the global context, strengthening legislative public aspiration systems cannot be separated from comparative international experiences. For instance, Canada and South Africa have implemented mandatory procedural standards for public involvement in legislation, including tracking mechanisms and compulsory public hearings. The European Union, through the European Citizens' Initiative, provides an example of how citizens can initiate policy proposals on a transnational scale with robust procedural safeguards. These practices demonstrate that the governance of public aspirations is not merely a domestic concern but constitutes part of universal democratic standards, which may serve as adaptive references for Indonesia.

From an ethical and social perspective, a public aspiration system within the DPR that lacks transparency and accountability erodes public trust in the government. Public aspirations are not merely a matter of legal procedure; they also involve social interactions that require ethical and empathetic dialogue. Accordingly, reforming the aspiration system should be understood within a broader comparative context, as demonstrated by practices in Canada, South Africa, and the European Union, which emphasize structured and accountable public participation.

Methods

This study employs normative legal research, drawing on a conceptual and statutory approach, to examine the relevant administrative law principles

governing the DPR's management of public aspiration networks. The conceptual approach is used to elucidate the foundational theories underpinning the principles of accountability and effectiveness in public service delivery, while the statutory approach is applied to analyze the positive legal norms that regulate legislative aspiration mechanisms, including Law No. 17 of 2014 (MD3 Law), the Public Service Law, and internal DPR regulations.

The data sources include primary legal materials, such as statutory regulations and official documents of the DPR, as well as secondary legal materials, including scholarly literature, previous research findings, and relevant academic publications. Data were collected through library research, employing documentation techniques to examine regulations, institutional documents, and academic sources. The data were subsequently analyzed using qualitative juridical methods, including content analysis to assess the substantive aspects of legal norms, and prescriptive analysis to formulate a normative conceptual framework capable of addressing administrative governance issues in public aspiration management.

Discussion

The Role of Administrative Law in Representative Democracy

Administrative law is a branch of public law that regulates the relationship between citizens and government authorities and serves as a pillar of institutional governance grounded in good governance principles. The values of legality, accountability, efficiency, participation, transparency, and rights-based public service delivery are embedded within it.[15] Within the framework of representative democracy, these principles are not only applicable to the executive branch or administrative bureaucracy but may be selectively adapted to specific functional activities of legislative institutions, particularly those involving direct interaction with citizens. Such adaptation does not imply transforming legislative institutions

[15] Marif Marif, Nurhaedah Nurhaedah, and Handar Subhandi Bakhtiar, "The Principles Of Good Governance In Health Services," *Jambura Law Review* 3, no. 2 (July 2021): 295–318, https://doi.org/10.33756/jlr.v3i2.7307.

into administrative bodies, but rather reflects a limited procedural alignment aimed at enhancing transparency and accountability. This is particularly crucial when the DPR manages aspirational communication as a form of legislative public service that directly affects citizens' fundamental interests.[16]

The role of administrative law in modern democratic systems is no longer confined to regulating state institutions in their executive functions; it also extends to governing legislative bodies when they perform administrative functions. With the development of the concept of democratic administration, public representation is understood not merely in political terms but also in administrative terms, as it involves the provision of services related to citizens' substantive participatory rights that are subject to evaluation.[17] Accordingly, the management of public aspirations should not be regarded as mere political communication but rather as a form of public administrative service that may incorporate selected administrative law principles in a limited and functional manner, without eliminating its political character.[18]

Administrative law in Indonesia is currently in a transitional phase, characterized by the strong influence of political dynamics on institutional design and the weakness of legal certainty in legislative public service practices. This condition underscores that strengthening administrative law must begin with recognizing public service functions beyond the executive branch, particularly in the domains of public participation and social oversight of legislators.[19]

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[16] Jamaliah Said, Md. Mahmudul Alam, and Maizatul Akmar Khalid, "Relationship between Good Governance and Integrity System," *Humanomics* 32, no. 2 (May 2016): 151–71, https://doi.org/10.1108/H-02-2016-0008.

[17] Mykola Veselov, "Administrative and Legal Ensure of 'the Best Interests of the Child' in the Field of Junior Justice," *Public Administration and Law Review*, no. 3 (October 2020): 49–56, https://doi.org/10.36690/2674-5216-2020-3-49.

[18] Johan P. Olsen, "Citizens, Public Administration and the Search for Theoretical Foundations," *PS: Political Science & Politics* 37, no. 1 (January 2004): 69–79, https://doi.org/10.1017/S1049096504003786.

[19] Francesca Bignami, "From Expert Administration to Accountability Network: A New Paradigm for Comparative Administrative Law," *American Journal of Comparative Law* 59, no. 4 (September 2011): 859–908, https://doi.org/10.5131/AJCL.2010.0031.

The decentralization of legislative processes and institutional autonomy within the DPR, in the absence of effective administrative oversight mechanisms, renders the management of public aspirations vulnerable to the misuse of discretion and deficient reporting. This blurs the boundary between representative and service functions, leading legislative institutions to interpret aspirational roles in a predominantly political and informal manner rather than through an administrative and legalistic framework.[20]

Within the framework of a *Rechtsstaat* that upholds the supremacy of the law, every act and decision of public institutions, including the DPR, must be grounded in valid legal norms and be subject to accountability.[21] Accordingly, the absence of explicit legal norms governing the management of public aspirations creates an administrative vacuum incompatible with the principle of legality in administrative law. When existing aspiration channels are administered without clear procedures, measurable performance indicators, or effective oversight mechanisms, the state fails to guarantee the public's meaningful participation.[22]

Accordingly, the understanding of legislative aspiration management must be expanded from a purely political to an administrative dimension. This approach strengthens the legal framework governing legislative aspirations as a form of public service subject to administrative law principles, thereby serving as a benchmark for representative accountability and legitimacy.

Public Participation as an Administrative Right

Public participation has long been recognized as a fundamental element of democratic statehood. However, within the framework of administrative law, participation is not merely an expression of political rights; it also constitutes a

[20] Oliver P. Richmond, "A Post-Liberal Peace: Eirenism And The Everyday," *Review Of International Studies* 35, No. 3 (July 2009): 557–80, Https://Doi.Org/10.1017/S0260210509008651.
[21] M. Imam Nasef, Ali Rido, and Eko Primananda, "Legality of State Debt Management: A Study on the Principle of the Rule of Law and Legislative Order," *As-Siyasi: Journal of Constitutional Law* 5, no. 2 (October 2025): 215–28, https://doi.org/10.24042/as-siyasi.v52.28322.
[22] Anne Marie Goetz and Rob Jenkins, "Hybrid Forms Of Accountability: Citizen Engagement in Institutions of Public-Sector Oversight in India," *Public Management Review* 3, no. 3 (September 2001): 363–83, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616670110051957.

substantive administrative right. This means that citizens are entitled to procedural involvement in government processes, including public policy formulation.[23] Accordingly, participation should not be positioned solely as a manifestation of democracy but also as a form of public service that the state is obliged to provide and guarantee within a clear and measurable legal framework.

In modern administrative law, the right to participate falls within the category of administrative service rights. This includes the right to express opinions, access information, and receive responses to submitted aspirations. Such rights must be guaranteed by formal legal norms, whether statutes, institutional regulations, or standardized procedures subject to evaluation. When participation is managed merely as a political activity contingent on the discretion of individual legislators, it constrains the rule of law, thereby weakening the accountability of public institutions to their citizens.[24]

The notion of public participation as an administrative right is further reinforced by various international agreements. The United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) affirms through the Aarhus Convention that public participation in decision-making processes is an integral component of fair and effective governance. The Convention stipulates that states are obligated to provide access to information, ensure public opportunities to express opinions, and establish transparent and traceable mechanisms for responding to requests for information.[25]

In Indonesia, constitutional guarantees of participation are enshrined in Article 28E, paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution, which provides that "every person has the right to freedom of association, assembly, and expression of opinion."

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[23] Ank Michels, "Citizen Participation in Local Policy Making: Design and Democracy," *International Journal of Public Administration* 35, no. 4 (March 2012): 285–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2012.661301.
[24] Barry R. Weingast, "The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of the Law," *American Political Science Review* 91, no. 2 (June 1997): 245–63, https://doi.org/10.2307/2952354.
[25] Gedion Onyango, "Legislative Oversight and Policy-Reforms in 'Unsettled' Political Contexts of Public Administration," *International Journal of Public Administration* 43, no. 3 (February 2020): 213–28, https://doi.org/10.1080/01900692.2019.1627556.

However, in the absence of detailed technical regulations within administrative law, this right remains vulnerable to being reduced to a mere procedural formality. Opportunities for expressing aspirations that are managed solely through recess activities, public hearings, or digital applications—without an evaluative framework—risk depriving participation of its administrative justiciability and substantive legal force, and ultimately transform public involvement into a symbolic procedural exercise that lacks meaningful influence over policy outcomes and weakens the accountability of legislative institutions.[26]

Notably, public involvement in government processes is not limited to mere opinion expression. It also encompasses participation in assessing service quality, ensuring information transparency, and evaluating institutional performance. Accordingly, public participation within the DPR should be understood as a form of administrative legislative service, requiring clear legal norms, procedures, and evaluation systems, as articulated in the administrative law doctrine.

In practice, the DPR has not yet adopted public participation mechanisms as administrative services that are justiciable under legal principles, such as the right to information, the duty to respond, and procedural clarity. Digital services such as *e-Aspirasi* provide only one-sided access, with no guarantees of follow-up or feedback. This condition reflects the absence of structured procedural standards rather than formal administrative nonfeasance, given that legislative institutions are primarily political in nature and are not fully positioned as providers of administrative services under existing legal frameworks.

The failure to integrate administrative law principles into legislative participation may result in disjointed accountability, whereby public aspirations are treated as political burdens rather than as elements of a verifiable administrative

[26] Johan P. Olsen, "The Institutional Basis of Democratic Accountability," *West European Politics* 36, no. 3 (May 2013): 447–73, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402382.2012.753704.

structure.[27] In such circumstances, the public loses effective instruments for controlling the provision of representative services, and oversight of legislators is significantly weakened.

Accordingly, public participation in the context of the DPR must be redefined as an enforceable administrative right, rather than merely a moral option or a form of political expression. Therefore, restructuring the legislative aspiration management system within an administrative law framework is imperative to ensure that participation carries substantive consequences, is subject to auditability, and exerts a tangible influence on public policy-making processes.

Administrative Standards for the DPR's Public Aspiration Channels

Formally, the DPR's aspiration management system provides several channels for the public to submit opinions, complaints, and policy inputs. These channels include legislators' recess activities in electoral districts, public hearings, digital application systems such as *e-Aspirasi* and *Sistem Informasi Legislasi (Sileg)*, and written submissions or direct complaints addressed to parliamentary bodies. In theory, the availability of multiple channels reflects a legislative institution's commitment to receiving and responding to public aspirations. In practice, however, the effectiveness and legal robustness of these channels continue to be undermined by a fundamental problem: the absence of standardized administrative norms governing their operation.

Based on an examination of official DPR documents and expert interviews conducted by Pujianti et al. (2024), the DPR's public aspiration channels tend to lack procedural instruments that would enable structured and accountable aspiration management.[28] There are no explicit provisions governing response timeframes,

[27] Neil Gunningham and Darren Sinclair, "Integrative Regulation: A Principle-Based Approach to Environmental Policy," *Law & Social Inquiry* 24, no. 04 (December 1999): 853–96, https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-4469.1999.tb00407.x.

[28] Yuwinda Sari Pujianti, Indra Perwira, and Inna Junaenah, "The Influence of the Phrase 'Online' on the Fulfillment of Public Participation in the Formation of Laws Through the DPR Legislative Information System," *JUSTISI* 10, no. 3 (September 2024): 785–805, https://doi.org/10.33506/js.v10i3.3449.

aspiration classification systems, urgency criteria, or reporting protocols in the literature. Aspirations submitted through digital channels frequently receive no formal response, are not systematically documented, and lack clear pathways for integration into the legislative or budgeting processes.

These findings reinforce the thesis that legislative aspirations are still managed as a political and discretionary domain rather than as a form of public administrative service subject to auditable standard operating procedures (SOPs). For instance, recess activities, which constitute the primary forum for absorbing public aspirations, are not governed by consistent documentation obligations across parliamentary factions or electoral districts. The outcomes of such recess activities are often not integrated into the national information systems of the DPR, and recess reports tend to be predominantly narrative rather than administrative, thereby limiting their traceability, evaluability, and institutional accountability.

Failure to meet procedural standards can have serious consequences. First, the absence of a tracking system for public aspirations renders the process opaque and unaccountable to the public.[29] Second, without audit or evaluation mechanisms, the performance of legislative institutions in absorbing public aspirations remains primarily evaluated through political indicators such as representation and electability, while lacking complementary procedural benchmarks. Third, the lack of success indicators or evaluative criteria hinders institutional reform based on performance accountability.

Structural weaknesses in legislative regulation further contribute to the stagnation of the aspiration management system, as there is no administrative framework that systematically links the outcomes of public aspiration absorption with the formulation of the National Legislative Program (*Prolegnas*) or the DPR's

[29] Thoriq Ahmadi and Ziadul Fikri, "Illusion of Public Participation and Democratic Erosion: The Case of TNI Law Revision," *Journal of Constitutional and Governance Studies* 2, no. 1 (December 17, 2025): 112–37, https://doi.org/10.20885/JCGS.vol2.iss1.art6.

budgeting process.[30] This indicates that public aspirations lack a strong institutional position within legislative decision-making processes, despite their normative recognition in law.

This empirical analysis demonstrates that the principal problem in the DPR's aspiration management system does not lie in the absence of participatory channels, but rather in the lack of a legal framework and administrative procedures embedded within each channel. Without legal certainty, institutional responsibility, and systemic institutional integration, the aspiration system will remain in a grey area between democratic formality and substantive participation.

Accordingly, strengthening the DPR's aspiration system cannot rely solely on digital innovation or symbolic public engagement. A robust administrative law foundation is required to ensure that every submitted aspiration is processed in a lawful, accountable, and measurable manner, in line with the standards demanded of public service delivery in a modern rule-of-law state.

Legislation and the Institutionalization of Public Aspirations

One of the fundamental causes of weak public aspiration governance within the DPR is the absence of an explicit and operational legal basis governing aspiration management within the framework of the administrative law.[31] Although the right to public participation is constitutionally guaranteed and reinforced by several general regulations, no statute or DPR regulation expressly recognizes the submission and management of public aspirations as a form of administrative public service subject to the principles of administrative law.

Law Number 25 of 2009 on Public Services, which serves as the primary legal framework for the provision of public services in Indonesia, is primarily oriented toward executive institutions such as ministries, government agencies, and local

[30] Mas Pungky Hendra Wijaya and Mohammad Zulfikar Ali, "Legislation Impediments in Reorganising Government Bodies in Indonesia," *BESTUUR* 9, no. 1 (August 2021): 1, https://doi.org/10.20961/bestuur.v9i1.51633.
[31] Aan Eko Widiarto et al., "The Authority Relationship of Central and Local Governments in Forming Laws and Regulations: Between Indonesia and Malaysia," *Legality : Jurnal Ilmiah Hukum* 33, no. 1 (February 16, 2025): 148–67, https://doi.org/10.22219/ljih.v33i1.36629.

governments. The law does not explicitly recognize the House of Representatives (DPR) as a public service provider subject to the principles of administrative service. As a consequence, functions such as the collection, verification, classification, and follow-up of public aspirations are not regulated as administrative obligations, but are instead positioned as ancillary legislative functions that remain political and discretionary in nature.

Law No. 25 of 2009 on Public Services, which serves as the principal juridical foundation for public service delivery in Indonesia, is primarily oriented toward executive institutions, such as ministries, agencies, and local governments.[32] The statute does not explicitly designate the DPR as a public service provider, subject to administrative service principles. Consequently, functions such as the absorption, verification, classification, and follow-up of public aspirations are not regulated as administrative obligations but are positioned as ancillary legislative functions that are political in nature and flexible in their implementation.

Similarly, Law No. 17 of 2014 on the MPR, DPR, DPD, and DPRD (the MD3 Law), as the principal legal framework governing the institutional structure of the DPR, does not regulate the mechanisms, indicators, or standards for aspiration management. Functions such as recess activities, public hearings, and the submission of public aspirations are described only in general terms, without clarifying who bears responsibility for managing aspiration data, how aspirations are processed, or how accountability is rendered.

The lack of integration between the aspiration and national legislative systems undermines the DPR's capacity to effectively represent the will of the people. Public aspirations are not treated as a basis for determining legislative priorities within the National Legislative Program (*Prolegnas*) but are instead relegated to informal

[32] Fitria Fitria et al., "Administrative Law and the Efficiency of Local Government Budgeting," *As-Siyasi: Journal of Constitutional Law* 5, no. 1 (June 15, 2025): 147–61, https://doi.org/10.24042/as-siyasi.v51.27598.

inputs that carry no normative weight within the formal legal system.[33] This indicates that the DPR has not yet recognized public aspirations as legally valid inputs in the public policy-making process.

This institutional weakness is further exacerbated by the absence of a dedicated unit within the DPR that is structurally mandated to manage public aspirations. These functions are dispersed across several bodies, such as the Secretariat General, research centers, and expert teams, without centralized coordination or clearly defined single-point accountability. In the best practices of public governance, services that directly engage citizens should be administered by a designated structural unit with explicit administrative responsibility, supported by a defined budget, standardized operating procedures (SOPs), and an established evaluation system.

Under such conditions, the management of legislative aspirations becomes highly susceptible to politicization, as the absence of an administrative legal framework results in a lack of procedural safeguards that constrain the scope of discretion exercised by members of the DPR. Public aspirations may be disregarded without consequence, selectively followed up based on narrow political interests, or manipulated as campaign instruments in the absence of evaluative mechanisms. Without a legal framework, aspirations lose their advocacy.

Strengthening the DPR's role as a genuinely representative institution requires regulatory reform to reposition aspiration management as an administrative obligation rather than merely a form of political interaction. This may be achieved through a limited amendment to the MD3 Law by introducing a specific chapter on the governance of legislative aspirations as part of public service delivery, subject to administrative evaluation, transparency of information, and accountability standards.

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[33] Bagus Hermanto et al., "Legislative Planning and Quality of Legislation: The Case of Prolegnas in Indonesia Lawmaking," *The Journal of Legislative Studies*, April 2025, 1–29, https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2025.2492459.

Such regulatory reform must also be accompanied by internal institutional strengthening, including the establishment of a dedicated body or directorate responsible for the integrated management of public aspirations. This unit would function as an interface between the public and the legislative process while also serving as a manager of information, a policy-analysis hub, and a facilitator of transparent and inclusive public participation.[34]

Accordingly, the governance of public aspirations by the DPR requires a solid legal foundation and an accountable institutional architecture to ensure that representative functions are exercised not merely symbolically but also substantively and in an administratively responsible way. This constitutes the core application of administrative law in modern legislative institutions.

Comparative Study on the Administrative Governance of the DPR's Public Aspiration Network in Indonesia and Other Countries

Formulating effective reforms to govern public aspirations requires comparative studies of legislative and administrative practices in other countries as valuable normative and strategic foundations.[35] Numerous jurisdictions have adopted explicit administrative law frameworks to regulate public participation in the legislative process, including procedural standards, feedback mechanisms, and dedicated institutional units that serve as interfaces between society and parliament. The lessons drawn from these practices strengthen the argument for integrating administrative law principles into the management of legislative aspirations in Indonesia.

For example, in Canada, public hearing mechanisms regulated by federal and provincial legal frameworks require legislative bodies to formally receive public

[34] Mohamad Syaiful Aris et al., "Penerapan Asas-Asas Umum Pemerintahan Yang Baik Dalam Penyelenggaraan Pelayanan Publik Di Lembaga Permasyarakatan," *Litigasi* 23, no. 2 (October 2022): 253–71, https://doi.org/10.23969/litigasi.v23i2.5077.

[35] Murat Önder and Ülkü Nur Zengin, "A Framework for Comparative Analysis: Public Administration Across the Globe," in *The Palgrave Handbook of Comparative Public Administration* (Singapore: Springer Nature Singapore, 2022), 51–76, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-1208-5_3.

input during the law-making process.[36] Legislative committees are legally mandated to document all forms of public participation, prepare summaries of recommendations, and report institutional responses to such aspirations. These procedures are conducted openly, digitally recorded, and subjected to administrative audits. This system not only enhances legislative legitimacy but also institutionalizes public participation as a structured and traceable administrative service.

Similarly, in South Africa, the Constitution affords extensive space for citizen participation in legislative processes. The Constitutional Court of South Africa, in its decision in *Doctors for Life International v. Speaker of the National Assembly* affirmed that public participation constitutes an essential component of constitutionally valid legislative procedure. In response, the South African Parliament established the Public Participation and Information Office, which bears full responsibility for managing public aspirations, integrating them into the policy agenda, and producing periodic reports on the effectiveness of public participation as an administrative service.[37]

Another relevant model is found in the European Union through the European Citizens' Initiative (ECI), which grants citizens the direct right to propose new policies at the European level. The ECI is supported by a comprehensive digital system, clear procedural requirements, and administrative oversight from the European Commission. This mechanism reflects the application of administrative due process in legislative participation, providing legal guarantees for the right to

[36] Branka Zolak Poljašević, Ana Marija Gričnik, and Simona Šarotar Žižek, "Human Resource Management in Public Administration: The Ongoing Tension Between Reform Requirements and Resistance to Change," *Administrative Sciences* 15, no. 3 (March 11, 2025): 94, https://doi.org/10.3390/admsci15030094.

[37] Temitayo Isaac Odeyemi, Damilola Temitope Olorunshola, and Boluwatife Solomon Ajibola, "Turning Public Engagement into Standard Practice : Institutionalisation in the Work of the South African Parliament," *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 29, no. 3 (July 2023): 406–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2023.2195147.

be heard and imposing a duty on legislative institutions to issue formal responses to qualifying initiatives.[38]

Within the Southeast Asian region, the Philippines has established the House of Representatives Public Information Office as a public service center for receiving and managing citizen aspirations. This office operates under standardized protocols for receiving, recording, and following public input. Submitted aspirations are assigned tracking numbers and integrated into a parliamentary information system that is accessible to the public. Moreover, legislators are required to submit annual reports detailing their responses and follow-up actions on public aspirations as a form of administrative accountability.[39]

Indonesia's DPR still remains at an embryonic stage in developing an administrative law-based system for governing legislative aspirations, in contrast to other comparative practices. There are no legal provisions equivalent to the public participation clauses found in the aforementioned jurisdictions, nor is there a permanent structural unit within the DPR tasked with the administrative management of public aspirations. Aspirations are more frequently treated as the personal concerns of individual politicians rather than as institutional obligations.

This divergence in administrative approaches between executive and legislative bodies has produced imbalances in public service delivery, as legislative institutions have yet to fully adopt administrative and evaluative frameworks. Consequently, legislative performance accountability is difficult to measure objectively and verifiably.[40]

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[38] Eleni Ilia, "Casting Votes into the Void: An Empirical Study of the Twelve Years of the European Citizens' Initiative," *Nordic Journal of European Law* 7, no. 3 (September 24, 2024): 50–77, https://doi.org/10.36969/njel.v7i3.26276.

[39] Alex Bello Brillantes, Cliff Ransom Wendell B. Lilangan, and Karl Emmanuel V. Ruiz, "Open Government and Freedom of Information: The Philippine Experience," in *Open Government and Freedom of Information* (Cham: Springer, 2023), 75–106, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-35863-0_4.

[40] Christopher Pollitt, "Clarifying Convergence. Striking Similarities and Durable Differences in Public Management Reform," *Public Management Review* 3, no. 4 (December 2001): 471–92, https://doi.org/10.1080/14616670110071847.

Lessons drawn from comparative experiences demonstrate that the application of administrative law principles to the aspirational functions of legislative institutions offers three principal advantages: (1) promoting consistency in public service delivery across state institutions; (2) strengthening the legitimacy of the legislative process through structured and institutionalized public engagement; and (3) providing legally grounded evaluative instruments to assess legislative accountability. These findings confirm that a robust public aspiration system does not emerge from political intent alone but rather from a well-established administrative framework that is verifiable, enforceable, and embedded within formal legal norms.

Accordingly, Indonesia must promptly adapt these best practices to the institutional design of the DPR. Without legal reform and the development of adequate administrative infrastructure, the DPR's aspiration system will remain vulnerable to inconsistency, manipulation, and ineffectiveness in realizing meaningful public participation in the future.

In summary, the comparative analysis demonstrates both convergences and divergences in the administrative governance of public aspirations across jurisdictions. Countries such as Canada, South Africa, the European Union, and the Philippines share a common commitment to institutionalizing public participation through formal administrative frameworks, including standardized procedures, dedicated institutional units, and legally enforceable accountability mechanisms. These systems treat public aspirations not merely as political expressions but as structured administrative processes subject to documentation, evaluation, and institutional response. In contrast, Indonesia's DPR lacks a comparable administrative architecture, with public aspirations remaining largely informal, discretionary, and politically driven. While other jurisdictions emphasize procedural clarity, transparency, and measurable accountability, Indonesia's current approach reflects limited integration of administrative law principles within legislative functions. This comparison highlights a critical gap and underscores the

need to transform the DPR's aspiration system into a formal administrative service aligned with the principles of good governance and democratic accountability.

Integrating Good Governance Principles into the Legislative Aspiration System

The principles of good governance constitute a normative foundation for sound public administration and are increasingly regarded as international benchmarks for public institutions' performance. These principles include legality, accountability, participation, efficiency, effectiveness, transparency, and procedural fairness. Within the context of legislative institutions, good governance principles apply not only to law-making and oversight functions but also to the mechanisms for receiving and managing public aspirations.[41]

Within the framework of administrative law, good governance principles function as instruments to ensure that all public services, including legislative aspiration mechanisms, are delivered in accordance with legal standards, are accountable, and remain open to public oversight. Accordingly, the application of these principles to the DPR's aspiration system is a fundamental prerequisite for ensuring that public opinion channels do not operate merely in a symbolic or elitist manner but instead exert a substantive influence on state policy-making.

First, the principle of legality requires that every action or policy undertaken by a public institution is grounded in a clear legal basis. In the context of legislative aspirations, legality requires that all procedures for receiving, classifying, and following up on public aspirations be regulated by formal DPR regulations with binding legal force. The absence of such formal legal foundations, such as internal standard operating procedures (SOPs) or parliamentary rules governing aspiration services, renders aspiration management vulnerable to inconsistency and manipulation.

[41] Fitria et al., "Administrative Law and the Efficiency of Local Government Budgeting."

Second, the principle of accountability necessitates the clear allocation of responsibility within the aspiration management process, including the identification of the actors responsible for receiving, processing, and reporting public aspirations. Accountability is directed not only outward to the public but also vertically within the internal structure of the DPR. In a well-functioning institutional system, public aspirations must be subject to audit and reporting mechanisms that are publicly accessible and monitored by the internal oversight authorities.

Third, the principle of participation must be understood not merely as public access to express opinions but as meaningful engagement within the legislative process. Meaningful participation requires transparency of information, structured feedback, and tangible integration of public aspirations into policy. This includes the obligation to provide formal responses to submitted aspirations rather than limiting participation to passive documentation without follow-up.[42]

Fourth, the principle of transparency demands that the public be granted access to information concerning the processes and outcomes of aspiration management. Information such as the volume of submitted aspirations, dominant thematic issues, levels of follow-up, and related policy outcomes should be made publicly available—for instance, through the DPR's official website or in annual reports. Lack of transparency reinforces the perception that public aspirations hold little value in decision-making processes.[43]

Fifth, the principles of efficiency and effectiveness emphasize the optimal use of resources and achievement of measurable outcomes. In this regard, aspirations managed through digital platforms or information systems must be linked to institutional key performance indicators (KPIs) to assess responsiveness in concrete terms. Such indicators may include the average response time to public

[42] Muhammad Ruhly Kesuma Dinata et al., "Good Governance and Local Wisdom in Law Enforcement," *Volksgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Dan Konstitusi*, December 2022, 227–42, https://doi.org/10.24090/volksgeist.v5i2.6740.
[43] Satria Unggul Wicaksana Prakasa et al., "Public Procurement Nexus Social for Mitigate the Corruption: Lesson from Indonesia," *Lex Scientia Law Review* 7, no. 2 (November 2023): 413–48, https://doi.org/10.15294/lesrev.v7i2.72630.

aspirations, the number of aspirations incorporated into legislative agendas, or levels of public satisfaction with aspiration-related services.

Good governance principles tend to be more fully implemented within executive administrative systems, while legislative institutions continue to resist administrative evaluation frameworks and legally standardized performance measurements.[44] This underscores the need to extend the adoption of good governance principles into the legislative domain—not merely as a normative commitment, but in the form of concrete systems, performance indicators, and accountability mechanisms.[45]

To this end, the DPR must formulate a Public Aspirations Governance Framework grounded in administrative law principles and good governance. Such a framework may include the following: a) Mandatory standard operating procedures (SOPs) for the management of public aspirations; b) A structurally defined legislative public service unit with clearly delineated functions; c) Performance evaluation mechanisms for aspiration-related services; d) Annual public reports that are transparent and accessible to the public; e) Administrative complaint mechanisms to address negligence or deviations in aspiration management. This framework would provide a concrete institutional foundation for ensuring that legislative aspiration services operate lawfully, accountably, and in a governance-oriented manner.

The integration of good governance principles into the legislative aspiration system not only strengthens the DPR's performance as a representative institution but also fosters public trust in Indonesia's democratic system. In the absence of these principles, aspiration channels are likely to remain instruments of symbolic legitimacy, devoid of substantive impact on policy transformation.

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[44] Basuki Rahmat, Beni Hartanto, and Acep Hilman, "Bureaucratic Reform in Indonesia: From "Public Administration" to 'Public Management,'" *Journal of Local Government Issues* 7, no. 2 (September 2024): 144–58, https://doi.org/10.22219/logos.v7i2.33848.

[45] Abdul Rauf, "The Application of The Principle of Openness in Realizing Good Governance," *Jurnal Hukum Volkgeist* 6, no. 1 (December 2021): 46–50, https://doi.org/10.35326/volkgeist.v6i1.1586.

Integrating Legislative Aspirations into the Administrative Law Regime

The principal critique of the DPR's public aspiration management system is the absence of functional integration between aspirational processes and the administrative law framework. Legislative aspirations tend to be managed merely as part of electoral political activities, emphasizing image-building, personalized communication with constituents, and party-political agendas, without embedded administrative accountability.[46] This condition generates administrative dissonance, namely a mismatch between public expectations of representative services and institutional reality, which fails to provide a structurally responsive system.

This critique is further reinforced by the absence of due administrative processes within the DPR's aspiration management practices. There are no mechanisms to ensure the right to be heard, the right to receive a reasoned response, or the right to challenge administrative non-response, as recognized in modern administrative law doctrine. In effect, citizens do not possess enforceable administrative rights over their aspirations. Within a rule-of-law state, this constitutes a serious deficiency as it undermines the principle of equality before administrative law. Moreover, criticism is also directed at the use of digital channels such as *e-Aspirasi*, which function merely as passive data-collection tools, devoid of administrative value. These platforms lack performance indicators, external oversight mechanisms and public accountability reporting. Consequently, the system operates as a form of simulated democracy, serving as a façade of participation rather than a legally meaningful one.

To address these critiques, a more feasible approach is to optimize existing institutional structures and introduce limited procedural improvements, rather

[46] Saiful Risky, Sholahuddin Al-Fatih, and Mabarroh Azizah, "Political Configuration of Electoral System Law in Indonesia from State Administration Perspective," *Volksgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Dan Konstitusi*, June 2023, 119–30, https://doi.org/10.24090/volksgeist.v6i1.7940.

than fully integrating the legislative aspiration system into an administrative law regime. Several strategic solutions may be proposed.

1) Designating Aspirations as an Administrative Public Service

   The first step is to explicitly define the submission and management of public aspirations by the Dewan *Perwakilan Rakyat Republik Indonesia* (DPR) as an administrative service. This would require amendments to the MD3 Law and/or the enactment of a specific DPR Regulation on Public Aspiration Governance. Through such reforms, aspiration management would be subject to administrative law principles, including the duty to respond (*obligatio respondendi*), procedural transparency, and formal accountability.

2) Establishment of a Public Aspiration Service Unit within the DPR

   The second solution involves creating a Public Aspiration Service Body within the DPR, endowed with a purely administrative function. This unit should be equipped with a clear organizational structure, dedicated budgetary allocations, professional staff, and an integrated information system. It serves as a central hub for receiving, verifying, categorizing, and reporting public aspirations while bearing administrative responsibility for compliance with established service standards.

3) Strengthening Performance-Based Evaluation of Aspiration Management

   The next step is to introduce a performance-based evaluation system for aspiration management. This includes indicators such as response time, proportion of aspirations followed up, levels of public participation, and public satisfaction. Evaluations should be conducted periodically by external oversight bodies, such as the Supreme Audit Institution (BPK) or the Ombudsman, and the results should be disclosed publicly to ensure transparency and accountability.

4) Administrative Objection and Legal Remedy Mechanisms

Another solution is to provide avenues for citizens to submit administrative objections when their aspirations are ignored or improperly managed. This may be pursued through administrative complaint procedures or, where negligence or abuse of authority occurs, through a judicial review before the Administrative Court. Such mechanisms would strengthen the legal position of citizens as subjects of administrative services, rather than merely as voters.

5) Legal Education and Participatory Outreach

The final solution entails strengthening public legal education regarding citizens' administrative rights in the legislative context. The DPR, in collaboration with higher education institutions in law, may develop curricula and outreach modules for meaningful participation in the legislative process, including the right to demand administrative responses from representative institutions.

Collectively, these measures aim to reposition legislative aspiration management as a legally grounded, institutionally accountable, and citizen-oriented administrative function, thereby reinforcing democratic participation and the rule of law.

Through these measures, the legislative aspiration system would no longer be perceived as merely an ancillary activity of democracy but rather as a form of substantive public service carrying clear legal and administrative consequences. Such reform would not only enhance the DPR's legitimacy in the eyes of the public but also reinforce administrative law as the normative umbrella governing all forms of public service delivery, both within the executive and legislative spheres.

Repositioning Administrative Law in the Governance of Legislative Public Aspirations

The findings of this study make a significant contribution to the enrichment of administrative law theory, particularly by extending its normative scope to encompass the representative functions of the legislative institutions. To date,

administrative law theory in Indonesia has predominantly focused on executive administrative practices, namely, the regulation of relationships between citizens and bureaucratic officials in the context of public service delivery, licensing, and policy oversight. However, within a democratic rule-of-law state, the relationship between the people and their representatives in parliament also constitutes an administrative relationship, one that implicates rights to aspiration services, access to information, and substantive involvement in public policy-making.

Therefore, a reassessment of the scope of administrative law is necessary to accommodate developments in contemporary democratic legal systems. This necessity arises from the growing influence of international legal principles, such as good governance and the right to participate, which have generated demands to recalibrate administrative law to apply across diverse institutional functions, including those of legislative bodies.[47]

In this context, the contribution of this study lies in its theoretical proposal to reconceptualize the DPR's public aspiration network not merely as a channel of political communication, but as a regulatory service domain— a form of law-based legislative service subject to the principles of legality, procedural accountability, and measurable participation. Accordingly, this study shifts the classical perspective on legislative institutions, which traditionally emphasizes oversight and law-making functions, toward a new paradigm that positions legislators as providers of participatory public services.

From a practical standpoint, the findings of this study recommend a fundamental transformation in both the institutional design and technocratic management of public aspirations within the DPR. Under the current system, there is no institutional mechanism capable of ensuring the systematic integration of public aspirations into the policy cycle. Existing aspiration channels, such as recess

[47] Ahmad Fauzi, "Penerapan Perluasan Keputusan Tata Usaha Negara Sebagai Upaya dalam Penegakan Hukum Administrasi dan Kaitannya dengan Prinsip-Prinsip Good Governance (Sebagaimana diatur dalam Pasal 87 UU No. 30 Tahun 2014 tentang Administrasi Pemerintahan)," *Binamulia Hukum* 9, no. 2 (2023): 171–82, https://doi.org/10.37893/jbh.v9i2.371.

activities, digital platforms, and public consultations, remain functionally and procedurally disconnected from legislative drafting and budgetary oversight processes.

The absence of standard operating procedures (SOPs), performance indicators, and aspiration evaluation systems renders the process of absorbing public input largely symbolic and lacking accountability. This study proposes a set of strategic solutions by developing an integrated public administration–based aspiration system model, which encompasses the following: a) Simplified and adaptive procedural guidelines (input–review–response), taking into account institutional capacity and practical constraints; b) Aspiration classification mechanisms based on urgency, geographic scope, and policy sectors; c) Clearly designated institutional responsibilities accompanied by quarterly reporting mechanisms; d) Open feedback channels that enable the public to track the status and follow up on submitted aspirations. This integrated model is designed to transform the management of legislative aspirations into a structured, accountable, and legally grounded public-service process.

The implementation of such a system would not only enhance institutional efficiency but also strengthen the DPR's legitimacy as a democratic institution capable of responding to social dynamics in a measurable and transparent manner. Within the framework of institutional reform, it is therefore necessary to formulate a specific DPR Regulation or to introduce amendments to the MD3 Law that explicitly designate aspiration management as an administrative obligation. This approach is consistent with the principles embodied in the Public Service Law and the Public Information Disclosure Law, which require state service providers, including legislative institutions, to ensure access, procedural clarity, and guaranteed responses in their interactions with the public.

The strength of a system of government lies not merely in the completeness of its regulatory framework but in its capacity to develop internal policies that effectively uphold the values of transparency and accountability. For example, the

use of ethical guidelines and participatory evaluation systems has been incorporated into legislative reform efforts in countries with hybrid presidential and parliamentary systems.[48] Accordingly, the findings of this study underscore the urgency of reforming the legislative aspiration system not only through administrative improvements but also through juridical institutionalization through binding legal regulations. Such regulations would serve as a formal foundation for evaluating aspiration-related performance and as a source of public legitimacy to demand accountability from legislators.

Normatively, these findings have significant implications for the development of a democratic accountability infrastructure. In a modern rule-of-law state, accountability is not realized solely through elections or political accountability reports; rather, it must be embedded in continuous administrative mechanisms.[49] A legislative aspiration system grounded in administrative law would strengthen the pillar of public participation, guarantee citizens' rights to be heard, and foster a more egalitarian relationship between representatives and the people.

Such a system would also function as an early warning mechanism for detecting social conflicts, identifying sectoral policy needs, and evaluating regulatory implementation. By systematically managing public aspirations, the DPR can obtain concrete insights into citizens' priority concerns,[50] thereby ensuring that legislative programming does not become elitist or detached from societal needs. As emphasized in the United Nations documents on *citizen engagement in governance*, meaningful participation can only be achieved where participatory channels are supported by administrative systems that are transparent, responsive, and well-structured.

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[48] Giandomenico Majone, "The Regulatory State and Its Legitimacy Problems," *West European Politics* 22, no. 1 (January 1999): 1–24, https://doi.org/10.1080/01402389908425284.
[49] Bongani D. Bantwini and Pontso Moorosi, "Caught Between Educational Accountability Reforms, Compliancy and Political Interference: Perspectives of School Principals in South Africa," *School Leadership & Management* 43, no. 3 (May 27, 2023): 261–83, https://doi.org/10.1080/13632434.2023.2186847.
[50] Simbolon et al., "Professionalism of Expert Staff in the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) from a Public Policy Perspective."

Social and Ethical Implications: The Relevance of Participatory Justice and Moral Responsibility in Legislative Aspiration Law

The most tangible social implication of weak aspiration management within the DPR is the reproduction of inequality in access to public participation in the planning process. Aspirations that should constitute a fundamental right in a substantive democracy are constrained by systems that are insufficiently inclusive and procedurally opaque. Participation in the legislative process is frequently distorted by socioeconomic factors, including unequal digital access, elite dominance in representation, and limited public political literacy.[51]

In the Indonesian context, public involvement in the legislative process tends to occur only within formal forums, such as public hearings, and even in these settings, the majority of participants are selectively invited by the DPR rather than emerging from open, inclusive participatory mechanisms.[52] This condition leads to the marginalization of vulnerable groups and reinforces representational bias in favor of majority groups or those with greater institutional access. Consequently, participatory injustice poses a long-term social risk, eroding the legitimacy of the legal system and undermining public trust in representative institutions.

The ethical implications of this condition are equally serious. When public aspirations are treated merely as political formalities, without any obligation to follow up or substantively respond, a fundamental betrayal of the core values of legislative public service occurs. Public service ethics govern not only the conduct of individual officials but also the institutional structures and systems designed to serve citizens.[53]

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[51] Reni Silviah, "Dampak Literasi Digital : Kepercayaan Publik, Partisipasi Politik dan Media Sosial (Literature Review Ilmu Sosial dan Politik)," *Jurnal Greenation Sosial Dan Politik* 2, no. 1 (March 20, 2025): 38–45, https://doi.org/10.38035/jgsp.v2i1.191.

[52] Ivana Eka Kusuma Wardani, "Peran Mahkamah Konstitusi dalam Mengawal Prinsip Checks and Balances Terhadap Dewan Perwakilan Daerah di Indonesia," *Volksgeist: Jurnal Ilmu Hukum Dan Konstitusi* 2, no. 2 (December 13, 2019): 239–52, https://doi.org/10.24090/volksgeist.v2i2.2883.

[53] Jumalia Mannayong, Herling Muh. Rizal S, and Muhammad Faisal, "Transformasi Digital dan Partisipasi Masyarakat: Mewujudkan Keterlibatan Publik yang Lebih Aktif," *Jurnal Administrasi Publik* 20, no. 1 (June 30, 2024): 53–75, https://doi.org/10.52316/jap.v20i1.260.

The absence of an administrative law framework governing aspiration management institutionalizes unchecked ethical discretion. Within such a system, legislators have broad latitude to determine which aspirations are addressed and which are ignored, without effective control mechanisms or moral–institutional oversight. This condition generates a moral hazard in the relationship between the representatives and the represented. Such practices may be understood as a form of ethical bypassing within democratic institutions, wherein foundational values—such as transparency, procedural justice, and personal accountability—are not operationalized through enforceable legal frameworks.[54]

A further social and ethical implication is the emergence of a democratic legitimacy deficit. In a democratic rule-of-law state, legitimacy does not derive solely from periodic elections but also from participatory and accountability mechanisms operating between electoral cycles. When public aspirations are not treated as an integral component of the legislative process, the law loses its participatory dimension and, consequently, its substantive legitimacy.

Functionally, public participation in public policymaking fosters the virtues of citizenship, such as social empathy, collective responsibility, and active engagement in democratic life.[55] Conversely, the absence of meaningful participation weakens citizens' attachment to the legal system and diminishes their sense of ownership of the regulations produced. Accordingly, neglecting the legislative aspiration system is not merely a procedural deficiency but also a direct threat to the democratic ecosystem itself.

Weak aspiration management creates space for social resistance and political tension. When citizens perceive that their aspirations are not addressed fairly and

[54] Misnah Irvita and Asriani Asriani, "Transparency and Accountability in the Justice System: Building Public Trust and Justice," *Priviet Social Sciences Journal* 5, no. 4 (April 2025): 26–40, https://doi.org/10.55942/pssj.v5i4.367.

[55] Patsy Healey et al., "Civic Engagement, Spatial Planning and Democracy as a Way of LifeCivic Engagement and the Quality of Urban PlacesEnhancing Effective and Democratic Governance through Empowered Participation: Some Critical ReflectionsOne Humble Journey towards Planning Fo," *Planning Theory & Practice* 9, no. 3 (September 2008): 379–414, https://doi.org/10.1080/14649350802277092.

systematically, they are more likely to seek alternative channels of expression, including public demonstrations, social media mobilization, or even delegitimizing parliament. Poorly managed public aspirations significantly increase the potential for policy-related conflicts at both local and national levels. The absence of formal aspiration channels also leads to the accumulation of unarticulated grievances that are not institutionally mediated.[56]

In the Indonesian context, this dynamic is evident in the escalation of public criticism directed at the DPR whenever controversial legislation, such as the Job Creation Law (*Omnibus Law*) or the Criminal Code, has been enacted. Many public voices have argued that the legislative process fails to reflect popular aspirations because existing channels for expressing them are ineffective and lack accountability.[57] To address the resulting ethical implications, it is essential to develop a Code of Ethics for Legislative Participation to guide DPR members. Such a code should encompass the following: a) the principle of information transparency; b) the obligation to respond to every submitted aspiration; c) avoidance of conflicts of interest in aspiration management; d) protection of minority aspirations and vulnerable groups; e) Clear procedural pathways and verifiable evidence of follow-up actions are required.

The adoption of this ethical framework would help embed moral responsibility within the institutional handling of public aspirations, reinforcing democratic integrity and administrative accountability.[58] Such a code of ethics must be safeguarded by institutional ethical oversight mechanisms such as the *Majelis Kehormatan* DPR or the *Ombudsman Republik Indonesia*. This approach is consistent

[56] Naomi Hossain, Anuradha Joshi, and Suchi Pande, "The Politics of Complaint: A Review of the Literature on Grievance Redress Mechanisms in the Global South," *Policy Studies* 45, no. 2 (March 2024): 139–58, https://doi.org/10.1080/01442872.2023.2193387.
[57] Xolani Thusi, "Can the Tenure of the Government of National Unity Enhance Public Accountability in the South African Government? (2024-2029)," *Administrative and Environmental Law Review* 5, no. 2 (January 10, 2025): 155–66, https://doi.org/10.25041/aelr.v5i2.3607.
[58] Andry Setiawan et al., "The Urgency of Legal Profession Regulation Amidst The Integration of Artificial Intelligence," *Lex Scientia Law Review* 9, no. 2 (November 17, 2025): 1484–1516, https://doi.org/10.15294/lslr.v9i2.26448.

with the European Commission's recommendations on minimum standards for consultation, which require parliaments to adopt ethical standards when engaging the public in legislative processes.[59]

This study opens significant opportunities for developing cross-national comparative research on the governance of public aspirations by legislative institutions. As illustrated in the comparative study by Temitayo and Damilola (2023), the experiences of countries such as South Africa and the United States show that structured public participation in the legislative process, facilitated by administrative law instruments, improves legislative quality and enhances public trust.[60]

Accordingly, future research should explore the best practices from parliaments in other democratic countries that have successfully developed law-based legislative aspiration systems, such as *open parliament frameworks*, digital engagement platforms, and public tracking mechanisms for legislative processes. Such approaches can enrich perspectives on national legal reform and provide robust empirical arguments for redesigning the governance of public aspirations in the DPR.

The social and ethical implications of the weaknesses in the DPR's aspiration system are extensive and profound, encompassing access to justice, institutional moral responsibility, democratic resilience, and social stability. Public aspirations are not merely political rights; they also constitute administrative and ethical rights that must be guaranteed within the legal system and institutional governance structures.[61] However, legal reform is insufficient if it is limited to procedural adjustments alone. It must be accompanied by moral revitalization in the design of

[59] Jeffrey Griffith and Cristina Leston-Bandeira, "How Are Parliaments Using New Media to Engage with Citizens?," *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 18, no. 3–4 (December 2012): 496–513, https://doi.org/10.1080/13572334.2012.706058.
[60] Odeyemi, Olorunshola, and Ajibola, "Turning Public Engagement into Standard Practice : Institutionalisation in the Work of the South African Parliament."
[61] Michael Lockwood, "Good Governance for Terrestrial Protected Areas: A Framework, Principles and Performance Outcomes," *Journal of Environmental Management* 91, no. 3 (January 2010): 754–66, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2009.10.005.

public representation systems, including the strengthening of ethical norms, the promotion of social inclusion, and the institutionalization of the principle of meaningful participation.

Conclusion

The analysis of the DPR's public aspiration network within the framework of administrative law reveals a fundamental gap between institutional practices and the core principles of the rule of law governing public service delivery. Public aspirations, although formally recognized as part of representative democratic processes, have not yet been organized within a system that is legally valid under the administrative law. The absence of explicit legal norms, structurally defined institutional units, and evaluative indicators with administrative accountability has resulted in aspiration management practices that remain informal, discretionary, and difficult to assess.

Conceptual analysis demonstrates that, within the modern administrative law doctrine, public participation constitutes an administrative right that requires legal protection and procedural guarantees. The provision of aspiration-related services by legislative institutions must comply with the principles of legality, accountability, transparency, effectiveness, and meaningful participation in the decision-making process. Violations of these principles undermine institutional legitimacy and generate inequality in the legal treatment of citizens as subjects of public administrative services.

Empirical findings indicate the low quality of aspiration channels, the absence of formal reporting mechanisms, and the weak integration of public aspirations into legislative processes, further underscoring the urgency of reform. Compared with best practices in countries such as Canada, South Africa, and the Philippines, Indonesia's DPR aspiration management system remains significantly underdeveloped, both institutionally and normatively.

In this context, the normative recommendations that may be advanced include: (1) the formal designation of aspiration management as an administrative public service within DPR regulations; (2) the establishment of a dedicated structural unit responsible for the professional and integrated management of public aspirations; (3) the implementation of a performance evaluation system for aspiration management based on administrative indicators; (4) the development of administrative objection and legal remedy mechanisms in cases where institutions fail to respond to public aspirations; and (5) public education and outreach to disseminate awareness of administrative rights among citizens.

Through the integration of administrative law principles, the DPR can not only strengthen its role as a representative institution but also consolidate its position as a legally grounded, procedurally democratic, and responsive public service provider. This constitutes the essential direction for reforming public aspiration governance, which not only enhances democratic health but also reinforces the quality of the rule of law in Indonesia.

Acknowledgement

The authors would like to express their sincere gratitude to all the individuals and institutions that contributed to the completion of this study. Special appreciation is extended to the Faculty of Law, University of *Pasundan*, and collaborating academic institutions for their academic support and scholarly environment, which facilitated this study. The authors also thank the colleagues and reviewers whose constructive comments and intellectual insights significantly improved the quality and rigor of this article. Any remaining errors or omissions are the sole responsibility of the authors.

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Article History
Received : February 3, 2026
Revised : April 17, 2026
Accepted : April 26, 2026