



The role of social media towards fomenting radicalization among youth in Bangladesh

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
<p>Keywords: radicalization violent extremism youth social media terrorism</p>	<p>The purpose of the study is to identify the role of social media in spreading radicalization among Bangladeshi youth and the factors behind them. The concepts of radicalization and violent extremism have become increasingly prevalent in global politics and development programming during the last few decades and the youths are getting involved through social media from the contents published by the extremist groups. The authors have used qualitative method to understand and scrutinize the findings of the study. In these processes, they have chosen secondary data analysis from articles, journals, books, newspaper etc. in order to collect and analyze data. Finally, they have tried to find out the factors behind the involvement of youths in radicalization and extremist acts through social media, the preventive measures taken by the Government of Bangladesh (GoB) and further possible initiative to boost up the preventive techniques to safeguard the youths. In the consequences, the authors assumed that lack of religious knowledge, adventurous nature, economic factors, cultural factors and identity crisis could be the reasons behind the vulnerability of youths involving in radicalization in Bangladesh.</p>

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Introduction

In a world of chaos, climate change, civil conflicts, nation-state rivalries, weapons races, and a slew of other violent events, radicalization has reached unprecedented heights. The spread of radicalization and violent extremism in the Indian subcontinent has had an impact on the entire area, including Bangladesh, and poses a serious threat to the country's security. The term "radicalization" is frequently used to characterize changes in attitudes or behavior and refers to a gradual social trend toward extremism. The behavioral component of radicalization, which refers to engaging in extremist activities, is distinct from the cognitive component. The concept of radicalization is neither absolute nor unaffected by the context in which it takes place (Ahmed & Obaidi, 2020). So, radicalization is defined as "a process in which an individual or a group is indoctrinated with a set of beliefs that support terrorist acts and manifests itself in one's conduct and attitudes. However, this is not a new issue; religious fanaticism and wars have long existed in South Asia. If we only look back to British rule, we can see how they left harmful legacies by establishing modern Muslim and modern Hindu identities and implementing a divide-and-rule program (Berkley Forum, 2018). As a result, Hindu-Muslim hostilities arose even during India's division. Communities that had coexisted for millennia across the Indian subcontinent fought each other in a catastrophic outbreak of sectarian violence, with Hindus and Sikhs on one side and Muslims on the other—an unexpected and unprecedented mutual extermination (Dalrymple, 2015). This historical backdrop will help us comprehend the strife and instability that has erupted across the Indian subcontinent, including radicalization, extremism, violent extremism, and terrorist

operations in the name of religion, which we are all witnessing.

Bangladesh has always championed a Sufi Islam that is inclusive, secular, and tolerant. Bangladesh has had good relations amongst its four major faith communities over the past 60 years. Major religious festivals are commemorated by national holidays and observed in a climate of relative tolerance, with many traditions shared by the world's major religions. However, religious extremism leading to severe terrorism is on the rise in Bangladesh right now. Since the statewide series of bomb blasts in 2005, it has become a big problem in Bangladesh (Rahaman, 2017).

If we go back farther, we can see that Bangladesh has been a hotbed of left-wing extremism and ethnic militancy since its 1971 independence. There was a concerted effort to rally support from extremists on both sides of the political spectrum. Purba Bangla Communist Party (PBCP), Red Flag, Gono Mukti Fouz (GMF), Biplobi Community Party, Sarbahara Party, Janajuddho, Gono Bahini, and others were among the well-known left-wing parties. However, due to a lack of popular support and marginalization, these groups have dwindled over time (Mostofa, 2020). Furthermore, migrant laborers, particularly those who travelled to the Middle East, were exposed to a specific form of Islam known as Wahabi Majhab, which was another element in Bangladesh's Islamization. Flows of money from the Middle East disguised as various forms of aid or charity played a significant role in the strengthening of various Islamic political parties in Bangladesh. However, following 9/11 in the United States, it became a new hub and spread like a virus.

Social media has been like a "masala in the curry" for the radicalized groups to boost up their propaganda all over the world. Osama Bin Laden recognized the

importance of the media at the dawn of the twenty-first century. *“It is apparent that the media war in this century is one of the most powerful methods; in fact, its ratio may exceed 90% of the overall preparation for battles,”* he said in 2002 (Schmid, 2020). Al-Qaeda was later able to use the internet to create social media profiles and chat rooms to spread their messages to the general public. Ayman Al Zawahiri, Bin Laden’s deputy, adding, *“More than half of this combat is taking place on the media battlefield.”* We are engaged in a media struggle for our ummah’s hearts and minds.” *“We must get our message over to the masses of the nation and break the media siege imposed on the jihad movement,”* Zawahiri continued. This is a separate battle that we must fight alongside the military battle.” By 2005, extremist groups had created 4,000 jihadi websites thanks to their use of the internet. Al-Qaeda alone has approximately 4,000 jihadi sites today. According to the University of Arizona’s dark web project, there are approximately 50,000 total sites, which include all types of extreme groups (Mostofa, 2020). The jihadist information ecosystem is a huge and sophisticated web that connects a diverse set of platforms. Since 2006, internet propaganda has gotten more professional. Jihadist content is freely available on social media and the surface web, as well as in hidden networks and the deep web. Al-Fajr, Global Islamic Media Front, and As-Sahab, three extremist Islamist media organizations, have published a large amount of propaganda audio, video, and text messaging.

The creation or sharing of information, ideas, career interests, and other kinds of expression via virtual communities and networks is made possible by social media, an interactive computer-mediated technology (Kietzmann et al., 2011). Facebook, WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger, WeChat, Instagram, QQ, QZone, TikTok,

Sina Weibo, Twitter, LinkedIn, Viber, Pinterest, IMO, YouTube, and a few more are the most popular social networks. At least 30 million individuals in Bangladesh use social media, according to the report “The Digital in 2018” co-authored by “We Are Social” and “Hootsuite.” It also indicated that around 18% of the country’s population is active on social media. Unexpectedly, mobile devices are used by 94 percent of social media users to access websites like Facebook and Twitter. According to the report, the number of these users has risen to 28 million. The report also revealed that 30 million people, or 93% of monthly active Facebook users, use their phones to access the site. Females account for 24% of the country’s reported Facebook user profiles (The Financial Express, 2011). Top social media of Bangladesh are Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, LinkedIn, Instagram, Pinterest, Imo, WhatsApp and CrazyHD (Quora, 2011). That is why the authors have tried to analyze and find out the patterns of how the radicalized groups spread their messages and propaganda through social media and the vulnerability of youths in the involvement in the extremist groups. As a result, in order to comprehend the severity of juvenile vulnerability and the elements that contribute to it, we must first comprehend who the youth are. In this case, the main objective of this study is to identify the role of social media in spreading radicalization among youth and the factors behind them. Also, the authors have tried to analyze and compare the patterns of the past and present techniques of the extremist groups in expanding their propaganda in the recruitment to their groups. “Any citizen between the ages of 18 and 35 should be classified as a youth,” according to the 2017 National Youth Policy (Ministry of Youth and Sports, 2017). From state law to international treaties, the term “youth” is defined in a variety of ways. Youth is defined

by the United Nations as being between the ages of 15 and 24, (United Nations, 1981) while the Commonwealth defines it as being between the ages of 15 and 29. However, the writers of this study primarily concentrated on the Bangladeshi perspective, which is 18-35 years old, and they would be evaluating all data linked to this age range.

Method

Research was conducted to close the gaps in our existing knowledge. As such, in this work, radicalization would include the use of internet to reach youth in Bangladesh with materials that have – in the past – and possess the potential to – in the future – indoctrinate them into an extremist ideology that involves planning or execution of unconstitutional acts of violence. The type of method used to interpret evidence regarding the research question is qualitative method to arrive at a rich description of the complex and layered effects of internet-based radicalization affecting the youth of Bangladesh. This approach is needed to come to an understanding about the intermediate stages of youth psychology that is shaped over course of potential indoctrination over social media, something that can go unnoticed and uncovered in existing published literature and datasets. The secondary data used in this work has been incorporated to investigate the proposed conceptual framework of the study. The data and the information from the selected sources were screened and then extracted to support our analysis. Such data come from primary sources of the original author, reporter or journalists, are easily available in authentic publications, and can be used by independent researchers to investigate their research questions and follow up meticulously on their research frameworks. Though they may have been collected by

someone for a different purpose, statistics and data are always open to interpretations, and as such can be utilized by us to overcome logistic and financial limitations. Secondary data used in this study have been obtained from newspapers, documentaries, government information, digital archives, and academic journals.

The following study is seeking to explore the role of social media in fomenting radicalization among the youth of Bangladesh in qualitative way of research by ensuring its ethical issues. So, there is mainly secondary data collection technique followed by the authors to find out the outcomes. Secondary data is information that has already been acquired by someone else and has been made available for others to use. Secondary data is typically simple for academics and individuals to get because information is routinely disseminated and available to everyone. On the other hand, it indicates that the data are typically generic and not adapted to the specific requirements of the researcher.

As this is a qualitative study and the authors has chosen the secondary data analysis technique to collect data, the main sources of this technique: newspapers, articles, journals, books, academic sites. A purposeful sample is a non-probability sample chosen in accordance with the characteristics of a population and the objectives of the study. Convenience sampling is not the same as purposeful sampling, often known as subjective or selective sampling. The authors chose this method of sampling for this reason. Regarding data collection qualitative method will be followed and the sample size would be selected purposively.

Results and Discussion

Genesis of radicalism in Bangladesh

Bangladesh was promised a stable democracy by its founding leader Mujibur Rahman for the first three decades after its establishment. But after that, Gen. H.M. Ershad resigned in favor of a society that was becoming more Islamic, personal politics mixed with shoddy institution-building, a lack of political responsibility, and a deteriorating law-and-order situation that led to the recruitment of the military into civic tasks. These issues are not unique to Bangladesh. The emergence of religious extremism in Bangladesh is aided by political instability and governance issues. The major political parties, particularly the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP), which propagates the Muslim League's ideology have supported the expansion of religious feelings, driven by political compulsions. This practice has unintentionally resulted in the emergence of extremism (Datta, 2003). Meanwhile, in 1976, the Jama'at gradually strengthened its base edging aside moderate religious groups like the Muslim League.

In the 1980s, around 3,000 Bangladeshis reportedly joined the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan, which was funded by the US and Saudi Arabia (Fair, 2009). In 1992, three Afghanistan veterans, Mufti Abdur Rouf, Mowlana Abdus Salam, and Mufti Abdul Hannan Sheikh, formed Harkat-ul Jihad al-Islami Bangladesh also known as Harkat-ul Jihad, declared Bangladesh to be an Islamic state (Riaz & Fair, 2015).

Another Chittagong Hill Tracts-based organization also wanted to help Myanmar's Rohingya Muslims (Institute for Policy Analysis of Conflict, 2017). In 1998, Fazlul Rahman, a leader of Harkat-ul Jihad, signed Osama bin Laden's fatwa calling for jihad against the United States and its allies, along with jihadist leaders from Pakistan and the

Middle East (Wright, 2018). In 1999, the group claimed responsibility for a botched assassination attempt on Bangladesh's foremost poet, writer, and human rights campaigner Shamsur Rahman, as well as a bombing at a cultural event in Jessore (The Daily Star, 2007). It's another bloodiest act was a grenade attack on an electoral rally of then opposition leader and chief of the secular Awami League party, Sheikh Hasina Wajed, in August 2004, which killed over twenty people and injured scores more, including Hasina herself (The Times of India, 2002).

The Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB) and its militant wing, Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh, were founded in 1998 and began recruiting and training in the early 2000s. It originated as a vigilante group in the north-eastern parts of India, which had long been a hotbed of left-wing militants (International Crisis Group, 2010). Due to inadequate law enforcement capacity and sympathy for these organizations inside Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), Khaleda Zia's BNP-led administration initially failed to take action against it (International Crisis Group, 2016). JMB's nationally coordinated and strikes on 17 August 2005, comprising over 459 low intensity bombs in Bangladesh's 64 districts which killed two persons and injured approximately 100 (BBC News, 2005). Harkat-ul Jihad was mostly based in the south, with *qaumi* (privately managed) madrasas serving as recruitment centers. JMB, on the other hand, was based in the north east and was inspired by the Wahhabi-inspired Ahl-e Hadith movement, while it also undertook outreach and recruiting efforts in the south west, in the Satkhira and Bagerhat regions (International Crisis Group, 2010).

The Awami League won power in January 2009 after promising an international war crimes tribunal to prosecute individuals guilty for atrocities

committed during the 1971 struggle of independence, a long-standing desire among the party's supporters. The majority of people likely to be tried were members of the JeI, while others were members of the BNP. In 2010, the tribunal was established. The execution of JeI leader Delwar Hossain Sayedee, a famous preacher in 2013 sparked nationwide protests and clashes with police that resulted in the deaths of hundreds of protestors. The proceedings were seen by Islamists as an assault on Bangladesh's Muslim identity (International Crisis Group, 2015). The Shahbagh movement and the war crimes trials set the stage for a new era of Islamist and jihadist militancy. JeI was on the defense by 2013, with the majority of its top executives facing charges. Meanwhile, Hefazat-e-Islam in late 2013 was rising fast (ICRC, 2013). Shortly after, a new type of jihadist mobilization emerged. The popular blogger Ahmed Rajib Haider, whose writings had in part sparked the Shahbagh demonstrations, was brutally murdered outside his home in Dhaka on February 15, 2013. An affiliate of al-Qaeda, the Ansarullah Bangla Team (later renamed Ansarul Islam), claimed responsibility. In addition to the defective trials, the rebirth of militancy has been aided by Bangladesh's profoundly split politics. The Bangladeshi high court barred jail from standing in upcoming parliamentary elections in mid-2013, citing a violation of the secular constitution by an Islamist party running. Despite the BNP's protests, the government pressed ahead with election preparations, and the BNP eventually announced its boycott the day before the polls (Human Rights Watch, 2014). This created a major political vacuum (Human Rights Watch, 2014).

Dialogic approach towards understanding radicalization process

Conditions are ripe for new kinds of militancy to challenge Bangladesh's security and religious tolerance as political polarization reaches record highs after the birth of Bangladesh and local jihadist groups build linkages with international forces. Despite robust and sustained economic growth in recent years, the country has seen an increase in violent extremism and terrorism. In their efforts to understand modern terrorism, researchers are increasingly concentrating their attention on the radicalization process in order to gain understanding of how people are susceptible to being recruited by terrorist organizations. There are some assumptions that terrorism is something that needs to be understood outside of its social and political context, and it can also be described as a psychological state that is unrelated to context and history. This necessitates to identify different personal characteristics. So, in the causal framework, a radical situation appears as the sense of broader concept such as political irresponsibility or socio-economic instability.

As an alternative, the radicalization process concentrates on comprehending psychological processes as one rejects the causal paradigm in favor of a discursive approach. An under-examined alternative to an explanation based on individual traits is to view involvement in terrorism as a process rather than a state, at least in psychological terms. This emphasizes a focus on process elements rather than the individual and their purported psychological or moral qualities, such as the shifting context in which the individual operates and the connections between events and the individual as they affect behavior (Taylor and Horgan, 2006). In the modern day of Bangladesh, social media in extremist lifecycles may be explained in

several phases, such as the shifting pattern of recruiting, strengthening belief by dialogic approach on social media, and socio-cultural qualities and patterns of digital media use, based on John Horgan's process model.

Factors behind the vulnerability of youth involving in radicalization

The majority of Bangladesh's population is Muslim, and Islamic ideologies are becoming more prevalent within the political system since the country's independence in 1971. Political Islam, whether it be party-based or not, is vehement in its opposition to the encroachment of fundamental Western ideas in politics, society, the economy, and culture and promotes a caliphate or an Islamic state. Political violence has become the norm in Bangladeshi politics, and the line separating militant Islam from mainstream political Islam is eroding (Rahman et al., 2014). However, political violence continues to be at the core of the socio-political system, making terrorism and violent protest a viable form of dissent and opposition. Since the country's founding, radicalization has been pervasive, and over time, corruption and bad leadership, politicization and failure of important political and social institutions like the law enforcement, the judiciary, and the educational system, as well as rising unemployment, have served as a breeding ground for extremist discourse and competing ideologies (Khan, 2017).

The benefits of recruiting young people to join terrorist organizations are numerous, and terrorists are increasingly capable and willing to do so. For instance, youth who have never been detained by the police are of great appeal to terrorist and violent extremist organizations. As a result, there is less probability of capturing more top terrorist commanders, giving terrorist and violent extremist groups more operational

latitude. Estimates suggest that between the ages of 15 and 18, 20% of all suicide bombers and terrorist organizations. Since a large portion of the adult population is just weary of fighting and reluctant to continue the struggle, groups who have had members captured or killed are frequently compelled to recruit minors. Youths are also assigned riskier activities on the justification that, if caught, their punishments will be lightened due to their youth. In order to ensure a cadre of educated and technologically skilled future leaders for terrorist strikes, young adults may also be targeted due to their talents (BIPSS, 2017). There are some factors and drivers assumed to be influential in spreading radicalization which could be the result of terrorist activities.

Economic drivers

Economic factors and radicalization research is inconsistent and contradictory. More recent research has generally disproved early studies that linked radicalization to economic reasons like unemployment and corruption, implying that such a link is shaky at best (Berrebi, 2007). A desire to acquire a loan before joining Boko Haram or the hope of acquiring one after joining were both major factors in the choice to join, according to one study (Mercy Corps, 2016). Poverty, money temptation, unemployment, interactions with foreign power to obtain money, societal inequality, and family unrest are all economic causes. According to Bangladesh Institute of Peace and Security Studies (BIPSS), the economic factors behind the youth's involvement in radicalization are unemployment, family unrest and instability, temptation towards money etc. (BIPSS, 2017). Some of the extremist groups are, Saudi connection, Islamic NGOs, Foreign NGOs, Local NGOs, Money Laundering, Fake Currency, Drugs and Underworld.

Since 1922, when it launched a branch in Cox's Bazar to support Rohingya refugees, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation has been working in Bangladesh. In Bangladesh, NGO related terror financing is the main suspect behind the economic growth of extremist groups.

Political drivers

Despite assertions to the contrary, the Awami League (AL) leadership supports Islamist organizations and makes compromises regarding the prosecution of Islamic extremism. The Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) both used Islam in their election campaigns to show that they were relevant to the country's majority-Muslim population. After 9/11, this setting made Bangladesh one of many international centers where Islamists vowed to wage jihad against the West and Bangladesh's secular government. This eventually led to the patronage of groups like Jamat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), Harkat ul Jihadi Islami Bangladesh (HuJi-B), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), and Ahle Hadith Andolon Bangladesh (AHAB), the majority of whom were responsible for the country's subsequent terrorist attacks. Despite the Awami League's efforts to restore some balance between Islamism and secularism the lack of transparency in 2008 electoral process the extremist organizations took advantage of that wiggle room to gain more support for their cause and carry out assaults around the country (Arefin and Ritu, 2021).

Religious drivers

Radicalization is a sociological process that plays a significant role in why people join violent movements. The importance of charismatic persons (both peers and leaders) in instrumentalizing identity is well

acknowledged (International Crisis Group, 2015). In the history of Bangladesh, it is noticeable that Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) had the professed goal of turning Bangladesh into an Islamic State and it has a sizable following among the country's urban, educated middle classes. Some violent radicals are purely motivated by a sense of religious duty. They believe that participating in jihad is a religious obligation. Jihad tells a compelling and moral story for people seeking reward. As a result, even when individual reasons are context-specific, collective and institutionally acceptable ideas like jihad can appear as a solution (Harper, 2021).

Psychological drivers

Identity development is a common, ubiquitous, and psychologically documented process that is crucial to radicalization. Psychological studies are starting to look into how identity development might become "maladaptive" and why some people are more susceptible to radicalization than others. Hogan's hypothesis suggests that, certain cognitive "propensities" can combine to form a "mindset" that is risky. People who have similar experiences of discrimination and exclusion are more vulnerable to a legitimizing "one narrative" that connects numerous origins of resentment and offers a simple remedy (Harper, 2021). Extremism in Psychology is a combination of radical attitudes and the choice of extreme means which can be derived from social context. In the modern day of Bangladesh in 2016, the Dhaka attack said it all as the extremists were from different social background where the radical groups used social media to take advantage of their vulnerable mind.

Cultural drivers

While Bangladeshi society has struggled with cultural radicalization, it has worked

to retain its rich cultural heritage while adhering to various ideological authorities. Extremist ideologies and their narratives can fuel extremism, but a rich and diverse cultural history provides resilience to them. For instance, consider the concept of Islamic identity or the concept of radical nationalism. Jihadists have taken advantage of Islamic history, major symbols, and concepts like jihad to represent jihadists as the only “real community of believers” and spread a salvation fantasy. A myth that promotes the idea of becoming a “martyr” at its foundation (Harper, 2021) the enforcement Sharia law and other extreme Islamic approaches violated the secular or democratic ideology of Bangladesh.

The role of social media in involvement of youth towards radicalization

This global trend of extremist groups using the internet can be witnessed in Bangladesh. A large number of internet discussion forums are dedicated to “defending Islam against Western invasion.” “Struggle for Islam in Bangladesh,” “Daily Jihadi News Paper,” “Kafir and Jalim are Frightened,” and “The Khilafat is Coming” are examples of Facebook sites. BD Jihadi Group, Islamic State Bangla, and Al-Qaeda Twitter accounts; websites like “Jundullahsite,” “Bangladesh Jihadi Group,” and “Morocco to Indonesia;” and Youtube channels like “Jamaatul Mujahideen Bangladesh,” “Jumuarkhutbabbd,” and “Ummah Network” have all been accused of inciting violent jihadi ideology among Bangladeshi youths. Ummah Network, a YouTube channel founded in January 2016, with over half a million subscribers and 43 million views. Even during the pandemic, they have been continuously publishing videos and documentaries on what Muslims should do, how to address COVID-19 problems, Western conspiracies, Muslim

victimization, and, most importantly, “female stories” on how women should maintain purdah (shielding themselves from men), how feminism is destroying women’s chastity, and the Prophet M’s lifestyle. This channel’s major goal is to promote Islamic ideals among youths and to bring the Ummah together (all Muslims). They promote their view of Islam and how it clashes with secular regimes through online videos. During the pandemic, their subscribers and viewers actually increased. Similarly, the Bengali journal Al Balagh has continued to publish articles that address the aforementioned topics. In Bangladesh, these online forums have aided in the emergence of a new wave of militancy.

According to a poll of 250 extremists performed by the Bangladesh police, social media propaganda motivated 82 percent of extremists, and 80 percent of extremists utilize Thrima, WeChat, Facebook Messenger, and other end-to-end encrypted apps for communication. When asked why they shared radical information on social media, some recruiters for extremist groups responded, “Our Muslim brothers are getting killed in Myanmar, Jerusalem, Iraq, and Syria; don’t we have anything to do?” They then tracked down who liked and shared these posts and communicated with them on a one-on-one basis. Because they have the most access to the Internet, it was discovered that the majority of the adherents of this new wave of militancy come from well-educated, metropolitan backgrounds.

Since 2013, terrorist organizations have used the internet to spread their ideology, making online radicalization a key concern for Bangladesh. Because the actual world has been transformed into a virtual world, COVID-19 has allowed terrorists to reach an even larger audience. For starters, because many ordinary activities are now forced online, recruiters will be able to reach out to a larger audience than before. Almost

all universities, including Bangladesh's most prestigious university, Dhaka University, have begun to offer online courses. Because of the tremendous rise in internet time, youngsters are particularly prone to online radicalization. Second, and more importantly, COVID-19 will cause dissatisfaction and anger among young people, particularly those who are educated. Bangladeshi society has long been marked by unemployment, underemployment, income disparity, pervasive corruption, and misery. COVID-19, without a doubt, has exacerbated these vulnerabilities. Every issue or failure will be exploited by opportunistic terrorist organizations. They will also make use of the epidemic.

The majority of respondents (29%) believe that various Facebook sites are an effective tool for engaging youth. Jihadi blogs and websites are mentioned by 26% of those polled. 24 percent of respondents identified ideological blogs/websites. 14 percent indicated that various links are disseminated in support of radicalization via Facebook. About 33.1 percent of people were named, and links to extremist websites were given to them. Males accounted for 29.9% of the group, while females accounted for 39.1%. Seventy-one percent of those polled said they had never received an invitation or a link via social media. Unfortunately, an incredible record was shattered on September 29, 2012, in Ramu, Cox Bazar district, by an incident that had its origins in the prominent social media platform Facebook. The majority of respondents (29%) believe that various Facebook sites are an effective tool for engaging youth. Jihadi blogs and websites are mentioned by 26% of those polled. 24 percent of respondents identified ideological blogs/websites. 14 percent indicated that various links are disseminated in support of radicalization via Facebook. About 33.1 percent of people were named, and links

to extremist websites were given to them. Males accounted for 29.9% of the group, while females accounted for 39.1%. Seventy-one percent of those polled said they had never received an invitation or a link via social media. Unfortunately, an incredible record was shattered on September 29, 2012, in Ramu, Cox Bazar district, by an incident that had its origins in the prominent social media platform Facebook. In gaming, there are also chat rooms. The use of online "gamers" to disguise messages in seemingly benign exchanges is becoming increasingly prevalent. Many online forums are password-protected and need login credentials. Government intelligence agents posing as online militants could penetrate some of them.

The study encompasses the forms of social media interaction which can instigate diverse forms of violent radicalization phenomena. The analysis tries to cover the ways in which internet-based anonymity can facilitate communications which directly, or indirectly, propagate violence as some modus operandi of their claims and strategies. Some effort has also been dedicated towards outlining the conceptual parameters of violent radicalization, touching upon a topic which has historically failed to achieve unanimous acceptability. The study remains focused on Bangladesh, and systematic discussions based on documented reports as well as first-hand surveys conducted include assessment of qualitative method. The correlation of hate speech, fake news, post truth, and discourses on extremism is touched upon, with added emphasis on the levels of influence of these discourses to understand how psychological issues and voids can trigger violent radicalization online.

With the advancement of time many branches of the study came forward. Since the mid of 1970's, as a social concern it has

remained an influential sector of social science. The purpose of this study is to establish peace and order by erasing conflict or adversities.

Conclusion

Radicalization intricate as structural inadequacies within specific psychological, cultural, political or religious contexts, in combination with exposure to an extremist group. Bangladesh's tumultuous political past and the battles between secular and religious parties to create a national identity are well-known. Examining the history and present of violent extremism in Bangladesh uncovers a long history of socio-cultural as well as psychological and political violence dating back to the country's independence struggle. The recent foray into international terrorism, as evidenced by the Holey Artisan Bakery incident, has cast doubt on previously held notions regarding extremist violence in the country. The assailants' affluent origins, beliefs about poverty, political unrest, and traditional types of schooling that fuel such violence may no longer be accurate. The dialogical factors through social media played a huge part in this incident. The conceptual framework shown here is useful for analyzing terrorism and terrorist actions in a political, ideological, and temporal context. It also serves as a description of a psychology of terrorism with a prime source called new media. Individual's ideology and social group support are most likely to be at the root of the development of a violent extremist. Also, there are some crucial aspects that should be looked after with careful consideration:

The societal impact of religious preachers' talks is a worthy topic of discussion. They have immense power to influence the attitudes of people from various communities. To ensure credibility, this campaign might be organized

in collaboration with the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Bangladeshi investigative sectors have to focus more on the victims' or militants' socio-psychological factors with other politico-religious factors, motivating causes to drive them down this route. Emphasis should be placed on conducting empirical study in the Bangladesh context in order to acquire a better grasp of the driving factors. Women, who are likely to have a key part in the decisions made by males in their household, should receive more attention.

In terms of preventing terrorist behavior, action channels must be differentiated from the process of generating radical ideas and beliefs. There is some evidence that there is a link between exposure to extremist propaganda and recruitment, the display of extremist attitudes, and the danger of violent radicalization among people. However, further research is needed to determine the precise roles and processes via which social media contributes to the radicalization process. However, there is little evidence to suggest that online extremist promotion or recruitment through social media causes people to become violently radicalized. This kind of holistic approach can eventually lead to a greater focus on understanding radicalization and religious extremism, which can be the first step toward fully comprehending and addressing the situation.

Declaration of Ownership

The authors listed above are the sole authors of this article. Every work that was used for the study has been appropriately acknowledged and cited in the report.

Conflict of Interest

There is no conflict of interest in this article.

Ethical Clearance

This article complies with all ethical standards and has received institutional approval.

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