

Majority religious politics: The struggle for religious rights of minorities in Sampang, Madura

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ARTICLE INFO	ABSTRACT
<p><i>Keywords:</i> discrimination religious politics intrafaith Shia Madura</p>	<p>The strength of the discrimination against the Shiites in several places, especially in East Java, cannot be separated from the legitimacy given to the Tajul Muluk-led Shia heretical sect by the East Java MUI. One of the factors causing this discrimination is the difference in the perception of interests and the unequal quality of authority. In the case of Shia discrimination, certain positions in society delegate power and authority to other positions. This condition resulted in inequality in the status of Shiites as citizens' rights and social subordination of the dominant group to other groups. This research was library research, where the researcher used data collection techniques with critical discourse analysis. In this study, the researcher interpreted the finding through literature, books, documents, and various digital and print reports related to Shia discrimination. In this study, the researcher found that the theological justification of the Sunni group is often used to discriminate against Shia. However, the basis of this problem is a conflict of political interest, where some groups are afraid of being dominated by others groups. Therefore, the researcher offered intrafaith dialogue to promote humanity by letting go of various political interests, as offered by Abu Nimer.</p>

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Introduction

The journey to achieve social justice in diversity for all Indonesian people in the globalization era faces many challenges and complexities. This challenge opens all religious discourses closed so far to be closer. The culture of fanaticism in society often triggers the emergence of violence against minorities, such as the Shia. This condition results in inequality in the status of every citizen and social subordination of the dominant group to other groups. Religion, in its growth, always interacts with contexts that influence each other. Therefore, understanding religious conflicts in the political landscape is important because religion has historically been linked with various socio-political conflicts and human tragedies. The researcher intends that the political landscape is the politics of recognition and redistribution, as Nancy Fraser mentions in *Justice Interruptus: Critical Reflections on the 'Postsocialist' Condition* (Fraser, 1997).

Furthermore, in *"Fields of Blood: Religion and the History of Violence,"* Karen Armstrong also explains clearly how religious followers often display violence that they articulate religiously and its socio-political relation. In that context, Armstrong describes that every political power that carries the name of God is built and defended by violence: religion is linked to violence (Armstrong, 2015).

In Indonesia, cases of violence, discrimination, and persecution by the majority against minority groups, such as the Shia group. The Center for Religious and Cross-cultural Studies (CRCS) of Gadjah Mada University published a book by Muhammad Fadillah entitled *Dari Masjid ke Panggung Politik* in 2016. Fadillah explained that violence experienced by Shia followers is not merely a matter of law and intolerance because, in other areas, Shia followers can safely and peacefully with other groups (Afdillah, 2016). Therefore, the case in

Sampang is unique and must be looked at in a deeper context. It is not limited to current events but also the process, causes, and situations from a broader perspective.

Religious groups often quarrel about social, political, and textual authority. At a later stage, authority uproots minority groups from their inheritance. In Indonesian history, Shia became a minority, and Sunnis became the majority because the Kiai groups who spread Islam in Indonesia are dominated by Sunni, especially those who follow *Syafi'iyah and Asy'ariyah*.

In democratic societies, the dominance of marginalized, minority, and generally disadvantaged groups often take two forms: adoption or implementation of the idea of *"formal political equality"* and *"equality of opportunity"* (Wahyudi, 2013). At this stage, minority groups, such as Shia, must become a collective mirror of the majority group, as they are considered the most authoritative about Islam. From this, it can be concluded that everything that is considered absolute and universal truth can experience degradation of meaning to be singular and subjective and adapted to the needs of the majority group. The unpreparedness of most Muslims to encounter different views and their immaturity to accept these differences is the root of the discrimination, violence, and persecution experienced by Shia followers in some regions. This situation impacts democratic politics, especially when the oppressed groups are not allowed to identify themselves with collective political identities. Therefore, people will always look for other sources or alternative collective political identification when the opportunity to identify themselves with their actual collective group is not available or marginalized (Mouffe, 2002).

There are many cases of discrimination and violence against the Shia group. The following section will elaborate on such discrimination and violence. On 14 April

2000, Al-Hadi Islamic Boarding School in Brokoh Village, Wonotunggal, Batang Regency, Central Java, was set on fire. On 24 December 2006, anti-Shia demonstrations in East Java were organized by Aswaja followers who disliked Shia followers. On 9 April 2007, there were acts of violence against followers of the Shia minority in Sampang, Madura. On 20 April 2007, there was also a mass mobilization to The Bangil Islamic Boarding School Foundation (YAPI) in Bangil, which is considered a Shia boarding school. On 13 January 2008, the commemoration ceremony of the martyrdom of the grandson of the Prophet, Imam Husein, in Lombok was attacked. On 29 December 2011, alleged Shia-affiliated houses and religious facilities were burned in Sampang, Madura. Finally, on 26 August 2011, several homes and worship facilities of Shia residents were set on fire by an irresponsible group, resulting in the death of Shia followers in Omben, Madura (Amin et al., 2013).

From various causes of discrimination experienced by Shia followers above, the researcher is interested in discussing identity politics often used by the majority group. Identity politics often implies further discrimination, such as; marginalization in social interaction, unequal access to economic resources, and class conflict. Therefore, this research aims to present socio-political recognition in society based on a cultural identity that can lead to religious harmonization.

The intimidation experienced by Shia followers in Indonesia comes from polemics over state regulations. The politics represented by the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) do not bring a common ground for the common good. Therefore, the Ulema decisions, which are dominated by Sunnis, in the end, become a reference in every religious policy by the government, where the decision does not represent a minority group like the Shia.

Method

This research used a literature study with analysis data collection techniques (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2012). Shia literature, violence against minorities, books, documents, and various digital and printed reports related to the research theme, especially news of violence against minorities. Furthermore, the critical discourse analysis method was also employed in a certain context and related aspects. Fairclough's Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) was used to understand the social practice forms constructing the social world, identity, and social relations. According to Fairclough, "Social structures determine not only social practice but also a product of social practice. And more particularly, social structures not only determine discourse, but they are also a product of discourse" (Fairclough, 2001, p. 31).

The discourse analysis that the researcher proposes, according to Fairclough, plays a role in the construction of social identity, social relations, and systems of knowledge and meaning. So here, the discourse has three functions; identity, relational, and ideational. The identity function was used in this study to see the role of discourse in constructing the social identity of community members. The relational function is related to the existence of discourse that functions to create social relations in society that are adapted to their social identity. Moreover, the ideational function points out the role of discourse in constructing knowledge and beliefs that become a source of reference for the community (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002).

Based on Fairclough's CDA, discourses experienced by Shia followers in Sampang affect the social structure and, at the same time, contribute to the creation of social continuity or social change. On the other hand, this kind of discourse certainly impacts social discontinuity. So, it means that special social

structures can continue to be established and maintained by creating discourse as the basis for legitimacy. The discourse analysis that the researcher did was an interpretation of the texts. In strengthening the objective analysis, the researcher also considered the community's socio, political, economic, and cultural aspects. This research has been prepared since November 2020. The data source in this research was the literature related to the research object.

Furthermore, the researcher also used several theories, such as Nancy Fraser to look at the politics of recognition and the politics of distribution, Elisabeth Shakman Hurd to look at the politics of religious freedom, Ahmet T Kuru to look at the power hegemonized by several Ulema, Yvonne Sherwood to look the guarantee of religious freedom supported by protection, and Mohammed Abu Nimer to answer various questions that are often addressed to Shia followers. In this paradigm, a dialogue approach can minimize conflicts in society.

The researcher used several approaches above, which are then compared to read and answer the problem of discrimination against Shia followers, which seriously impacts diversity and harmony in Indonesia.

Results and Discussion

Violence and discrimination against Shia in Indonesia

According to history, Shia has been part of the long history of Indonesian Islam. Some Shia ritual practices or celebrations have even colored local culture in several Indonesian regions. In *"Risalah Amman"* (2004), which is the result of the deliberation of more than a hundred mainstream scholars from around the world, Shia (Djafariyah) are included in the *Madhab* recognized by other Islamic groups (Bagir, 2017). However, cases of violence and discrimination against

Shia followers also often occur. If we look more closely, instances of violence and discrimination are supported mainly by political motives. In this case, of course, Shia followers in Indonesia will become a minority when faced with Sunnis as the majority group. This situation hurt the Shia followers as they then became systematically marginalized.

The conflict experienced by Shia followers in Indonesia is a conflict between two groups; Sunnis and Shia. It started with distrust and minimum dialogue with people with different characteristics. The Sunni group does not trust the Shia group because they believe that the Shia are heretics, like Ahmadiyah and the Eden group. This is because the majority group is still discussing theological debates. In addition, objective research on Shia in Indonesia is still limited. As a result, there is a misunderstanding about Shia, making it easier for people to misjudge the group. The absence of accurate data, in the end, gives rise to subjective public opinion (Wuryanto & Sadhana, 2013).

Traditionally, people in Sampang still practice a tradition of extraordinary respect for the Kiai. They make these religious figures role models and the only source of law in final decisions in all aspects of their lives: social, economic, political, and spiritual, either individually or collectively. Their respect even exceeds their parents and the government. Kiai's message is permanently embedded in every activity of the Sampang community (Humaedi, 2014).

Shia in Sampang, Madura

The anti-Shia group's consolidation has strengthened in Sampang. Terror and threats to the masses were not only consolidated by religious figures and *local Kyai* but also supported by the *Badan Silaturrahmi Ulema Madura* (BASRA). These actions already involve political motives. Maybe call it the

struggle for followers. This factor can be seen from the chairman of the MUI Sampang and one of the NU Kyai, K.H. Bukhori Maksum, “Constitutionally, Shiaism in Indonesia is not prohibited, but among NU residents, Shia cannot be united. We are like water and oil.” Kyai Bukhori’s statement indicates that the prohibition of *da’wah* and expulsion of Shia followers has the content of identity politics, which is dominated by NU (Hamdi, 2014).

The Shia violence and discrimination in Sampang are motivated by the cultural context of violence rooted in Madura, or the local term called ‘Carok.’ Regarding the attacks on Shia residents on 4 April 2011, if the Shia followers in Karang Gayam and Blu’uran villages were to uncontrol themselves and responded to attacks by anti-Shia groups with violence, there would be mass Carok and conflict (Jonge, 1989). So, apart from the government’s impartiality towards minority groups, the cultural factor of violence or ‘Carok’ is still inherent in the traditions of the Madurese community (Mahbub, 2018). The relationship between identity politics, pluralism, and the democratic system cannot be separated and segregated from one another. All of them must collaborate to ensure equality and non-discrimination against minority groups.

In Sampang, Shia teachings began with Kyai Makmun in Nangkernang, Karang Gayam Village which was inspired by Ayatullah Khomaieni and the Iranian Revolution. In the 1980s, he received information about the overthrow of the Iranian shah monarchy, Reza Pahlavi, who was considered supported by the US. From there Kyai Makmun sent his son to the Yayasan Pesantren Islam (YAPI) in Bangil, Pasuruan. One of the *pesantren* of the Shia Djafariyah sect. After graduating, Tajul Muluk continued his studies at the Sayyid Muhammad Al-Maliki school in Saudi Arabia in 1993. After that Tajul Muluk returned to Sampang. Unlike his father,

Kyai Makmun, who chose *da’wah* in private, Tajul Muluk chose *da’wah* openly to spread Shia teachings in Sampang. The progress of Tajul Muluk’s *da’wah* in spreading Shia finally got a response from local Ulema. One of the Ulema who actively spoke out against Shia was Ali Karrar Shinhaji, the leader of the Pondok Pesantren Darut Tauhid, Desa Lenteng, Kecamatan Proppo, Pamekasan. After Kyai Makmun died, eventually, the local Ulema actively provoked that the Shia were heretical teachings. This can be seen from the declaration of thousands of people led by Kyai Ali Karrar to reject the existence of Shia that Tajul Muluk spread. Efforts to spread hate speech, deception, and judgment forums have occurred continuously since 2006. Of course, these provocative are judged from the perspective of Sunni theology (KontraS, 2012).

The conflict that broke out on 26 August 2012 at 09.00 WIB began with the attack of around 200 Shia residents in Sampang, which left two people dead and 15 houses burnt (Suhendi, 2012). The attack was not the first time. Previously, the Complex of Pesantren Islam Shia in Nangkernang, Karang Gayam Village, was attacked in 2004, 2006, and December 2011 (Desyana, 2012). Various studies have shown that one of the most significant triggering factors is hate speech propagated by Sunni groups calling the Shia a heretical group.

Various meetings and consolidations of Ulema initiated by the government were more dominantly represented by Sunni groups identified as NU figures as one of the religious organizations in Indonesia. Here, the mediation will only benefit the Sunnis. Where the Shia group was eventually banned, followers were forced out of the village, and their sociopolitical rights were ignored. The government as a mediator has a difficult choice; Besides, the government is afraid of being left behind by its supporters, as politicians, they certainly do not want to

lose voters whom Sunni dominates; on the other hand, the government also denies the constitutional mandate to protect every right of its people. The Shia groups in Sampang are not only socially marginalized, but they have also lost their economic income to nomadic living conditions. In this context, we again see how the problem of redistributive justice interacts with the issue of recognition justice.

One of the factors that made the Sunni and Shia conflict in Sampang challenging to resolve and even tends to increase is the absence of political alignments from the government to resolve this conflict. An interesting fact that emerged from the political periodization above is the conflict escalation before and after the regional elections (Zattullah, 2021).

The politics of recognition and politics of distribution against Shia

Apart from economic problems, injustice is also present in politics, where there is a limitation on freedom of religion and expression for the Shia groups in Sampang. There is also difficulty obtaining basic rights, such as family cards, birth certificates, ID cards, etc. This difficulty will certainly have implications for limiting their political participation as citizens. Many Shia groups cannot vote during the local elections. Shia followers can only vote for the Presidential Election and Regional Representative Council (Faisal, 2019). The domination of Sunni groups in Sampang has lost respect for minority groups, where both Sunnis and Shia should also have the same access and facilities as citizens.

Because our identities are partially shaped by cognition or absence, often by ignoring others, groups of people are restricted, humiliated, or despised by the people or society around them (Thompson, 2006). In addition, the discrimination of the Shia group for the injustice they feel today is that they are forced to become Sunni

followers. They have been forced to convert from Shia to Sunni to return to their homes. As a result of this discrimination, 274 people converted to Sunni, and 21 remained Shia. In this case, the government as the power holder appears to be weak due to practical political needs. The Asian Muslim Action Network (AMAN) Indonesia, Siti Hanifah, criticized the government's statement. The submission of the problem to Ulema (Sunni) is considered a fatal failure of the government in carrying out the mandate of the Constitution, where every citizen should receive protection from the government as a state operator. If we look closely, this is clear evidence that Indonesia has not matured in accepting differences, apart from religious politics, which the majority group always used to push down Shia (Lumbanrau, 2020).

Observing the dynamics of the above problems, in this case, for the Shia group to obtain social justice-redistribution, they must deal with the penetration of the identity politics of the Sunni group, which will only further deepen inequality. Here, recognition from others is essential in building identity. The paradigm of redistribution of justice focuses on injustice from the socio-economic perspective of capitalism. It departs from the analysis that the roots of social injustice first start from the unequal socio-economic structure of society. With the production factor, which is always economical; social reproduction is an aspect that has always been separated in various analyses of capitalist society. That is classical thinking. For Fraser, capitalism is not only the economy but also includes non-economic dimensions, like public power and social reproduction. Without non-economic reproduction that provides care ethics, the economic aspect will not exist. From here, it is clear that social reproduction becomes a possible condition for further capital accumulation. On the other hand, the orientation of capitalism to unlimited expansion tends to destabilize the

process of social reproduction (Fraser, 1998).

Here, the researcher believes that the Sunni-Shia conflict in several regions can be minimized by using a political recognition struggle approach, conditioned by trans-cultural interactions and intense communication between cultural communities. However, this will present political resistance based on parochial and particular identities. Indeed, we have to understand in Sampang was not only a local conflict but also related to the conceptual understanding of different religions. The conflict in Sampang can also happen in another region, given the spread of Shia teachings throughout Indonesia.

Recognition of political struggle is more active at the cultural level. This happens because Sunni teaching is more readily accepted by the people of Sampang, apart from the above parochial culture where Sunni Ulema has complete legitimacy for the teachings of the religion. Movements that fight for recognition politics, such as the Shia group, see that the main fundamental problem in the social patterns of communication, interpretation, and representation. So, the politics of recognition in this context is faced with the cultural domination of the Sunni group, the absence of recognition and concern for others, and the lack of respect for the Shia group.

In addition, in this case, to borrow Fraser's term, there are also two forms of injustice. The first is socio-economic injustice rooted in society's political-economic structure, such as economic marginalization and deprivation. The second is cultural or symbolic injustice, rooted in representation, interpretation, and communication patterns. This second form is the complete experience by Shia followers in Sampang, as can be seen from the cultural dominance, which eventually became the target of the patterns of interpretation and communication associated with Sunni culture as the dominant group (Fraser, 1997)

One perspective requires political neutrality among citizens of a pluralistic society's diverse and often conflicting conceptions of the good life, where the state not only protects all citizens' religious freedom but also avoids as much as possible associating any of its institutions with a particular religious tradition (Gutmann, 1995).

Politics of religious freedom

The Indonesian Ulema Council has made recommendations on the status of Shia schools in Indonesia. At the National Working Meeting in Jumadil Akhir 1404 H /March 1984 AD, the MUI appealed to "*Indonesian Muslims who believe in Ahlussunnah waljamaah to increase their awareness of the possibility of the entry of Shiaism.*" The MUI stated that "*Shiitesm as one of the ideologies found in the Islamic world has major differences with the Sunni sect (Ahlussunnah waljamaah), which is embraced by the majority of Indonesian Muslims*" (Wahid, 2017).

The politicization of religion in its following form has various heterogeneous variants, such as regulating freedom of religion and belief, seeing the extent of the state's role in regulating the religious life of its citizens. Elisabeth Shakman Hurd said that state regulation of religion, especially freedom of religion and belief, governs religion (Hurd, 2015).

The case of the prohibition of any activity of Shia followers by the majority group is one of the cases where the rights of minority groups living in Indonesia are not fulfilled. In East Java, Shia followers are rejected by most people from following a fatwa or legitimacy from the East Java MUI, which states that the Ahmadiyah group is a problematic sect. The above prohibition is recorded in the East Java MUI Decree No. Kep-01/SKF-MUI/JTM/I/2012 concerning Heresies of Shia Teachings.

Governed religion is a form of religious construction adapted to the influence or desire of political power (Hurd, 2015). In the case of the regulation on the East Java MUI decision above, although it only applies at the regional level, it is broad in the context of Islam in Indonesia. Of course, it has a significant influence on the struggle of Indonesian religious politics, where the majority group is a role model for all forms of regulation and domination in religion. In this regard, a theologian, William Cavanaugh, concluded that religion is a source of conflict as “the creation myth for modernity.” Furthermore, in that context, the birth of political Islam has re-empowered various humanitarian problems that have never been resolved. According to William Cavanaugh, the traditional view of the religious system strongly supports the creation of the myth of religious violence (Jatmiko, 2017).

Furthermore, understanding religious freedom and its relationship to violence against Shia is evidence of the hegemony of some Ulema, especially regarding the interpretation of Islamic laws. Ahmet T Kuru explains that the teachings amplified by Ulema contemporary in teaching something are generally oriented toward protecting “Islamic traditions” rather than generating new Islamic perspectives. For example, in Shia violence, texts of holy books used as tools of legitimacy have multiple interpretations, where the interpreter has total power over the text (Kuru, 2019).

Here, some Ulema who hegemony ‘lock’ some fundamental Islamic doctrines only for a single understanding. It should not be interpreted with other arguments. Even though many other verses offer different interpretations, the initial multi-interpreted will automatically become exclusive when the Ulema has restricted and locked them.

The discrimination experienced by Shia followers cannot be separated from the power of Ulema as religious figures

who have their influence on society, where the power lies in the surrounding social and cultural structures, especially Muslim religious leaders in rural areas. Ulema, besides having a social impact, also influence politics. As the owner of spiritual power, the relationship between religious leaders and the community does not exist only in the social structure but also in the political realm. With high social status, Kiai later became local elites with relations and power, becoming hegemony against several minority groups such as the Shia.

The role of Ulema in strengthening the network is very much needed. Borrowing Gaventa’s explanation that Ulema has total power over social legitimacy where the behavior of Ulema as local elites has control-role and power relations. Furthermore, power cube theory gives scholars the ability a social control over others, individuals, or groups, in this case, the Shia. At the same time, the form of Ulema power relations in the Shia case has formed three forms of power; region, space, and state (Gaventa, 2006).

Shia followers often experience violence, a measure where Ulema are increasingly influential in religious values in authority to build their social environment. Without coordinating, the local community is directly moved and feels the emotional impact, such as in the Shia case in Sampang. In social stratification, Ulema has a privileged position in society. It can be an elderly and someone who is considered to understand everything. Therefore, most people call Ulema informal leaders in the existing tradition. The influence of tradition in building political culture does give rise to various forms of power. According to Clifford Geertz, Ulema’s explanation of the dominance of his power in society is called a *cultural broker*. This form of change indicates a mutually sustainable need. There is a symbiotic mutualism of the majority group

in realizing specific conditions where they have not been able to accept differences in beliefs.

Besides, according to human rights principles, the disproportionate distribution of the right to freedom of religion can be seen in (Undang-Undang) Act Number 1 PNPS 1965 concerning the Prevention and Blasphemy of Religion. Article 1 of Act Law Number 1/PNPS/1965 states that *“Everyone is strictly prohibited from knowingly telling, or advocating, or seeking public support in the public sphere, to interpret a religion recognized in Indonesia or to engage in religious activities that resemble religious activities form the main teachings of that religion.”* In the article, the pretext of regulating inter-religious harmony, what happens is that the state explicitly used the law as a tool to limit—not to say hegemony—minority groups that are allegedly opposed to the mainstream or majority groups (Rohman, 2018).

With this, referring to Hurd, freedom of belief should protect religious people and construct objects to be protected. In this case, the Shia. If we look further, the Shia problem is related to many other dimensions: political, economic, and struggle for followers with a long history. This can be seen in the harmony of Sunni-Shia in some particular regions. However, the problem is that the analysis of society becomes poor when Shia violence and discrimination are framed as a religious issue only, without other dimensions (Hurd, 2015).

Regarding the freedom to choose one’s belief as Shia, Yvonne Sherwood also said that space—in this case, freedom in religion—should guarantee protection. According to Sherwood, the existence of regulation in religion is not suitable to be included in the value of the law. Sherwood starts from the assumption that religion is not an inherent matter but a choice of individual interests (Yvonne Sherwood, 2015). Sherwood’s argument leads to the understanding that

violence against Shia groups is a form of incompatibility between the principle of freedom and the implemented practice. As representatives referred to in the law, religious policies regulated by a few institutions have not been entirely free from overlapping polemics. So if it continues without a specific solution, the presence of religion as an enemy, as Charles Kimball said, will happen in Indonesia (Kimball, 2008)

Several religious institutions often use absolute truth claims in the Shia case here. Institutions that seem to represent the universality of Islam have turned into *“authoritarianism”* with a discriminatory-sectarian interpretation of religion which was later confirmed as the only claim that *“represents God’s will,”* which must be obeyed by everyone without exception.

Seeing some cases of Shia discrimination in several places – but harmony in other areas also gives us an understanding that various political events, which are then interpreted as religious cases by the public, often trigger attitudes of discrimination in minority groups such as Shia. From this case, the fundamental thing that religious communities in Indonesia do not pay attention to is the lack of intrafaith dialogue. If referring to the opinion expressed by Nimer, discussion can minimize the occurrence of conflict because, in the debate, there is an exchange of ideas to make the opinions or beliefs of the intrafaith community clearer so that they can be appropriately interpreted (Garred & Abu-Nimer, 2018). Meanwhile, Ayatollah Khatami explained that dialogue could be intended as a form of appreciation for the identity of other groups and acknowledging their independence in ideological and cultural integrity (Khatami, 2003).

Abu Nimer explained that intrafaith dialogue used universal humanitarian principles; intrafaith dialogue is oriented

toward several goals to be achieved, such as solidarity, bridging social and economic injustice, alleviating human suffering, strengthening individual participation in community members, increasing equality, promoting values of tolerance and so on (Nimer, 2001). In addition, intrafaith dialogue is a medium for mutual learning by realising human interconnections (Huang, 1995).

So, it can be understood that the increasing conflict is caused by the lack of one essential matter, which Nimer calls intrafaith dialogue. Dialogue helps people break away from religious affiliation and identity to complete the component correctly. This is a meeting point for re-establishing communal relations between individuals. So that intrafaith dialogue can be used as a medium for conflict resolution to prevent increased intrafaith conflict.

Conclusion

The management of freedom of religion and expression in the Indonesian public sphere has many social injustice issues. Starting from marginalization, discrimination, and exclusion to misrepresentation. The pressure and repression of the majority group is still the standard in minority groups such as the Shia. Realities like this show that the face of public space in Sampang is still full of exclusion, discrimination, and marginalization of minority groups who are considered different. This is supported by a culture of fanaticism in society which also triggers the emergence of violence against minorities. The response of local people in a homogeneous culture, in the end, tends not to be ready to accept something new, especially religious teachings that are different from the majority. This condition resulted in status inequality as citizens for Shia followers and social subordination of dominant groups to others.

For Nancy, the public space as it should be can be a space for various discourses to fight for Shia groups as marginalized groups in Sampang to fight back. Marginalized groups must be able to circulate alternative addresses as resistance and opposition manifestos that articulate recognition politics. They must try to present an alternative discursive to synergize the parallel participatory democracy struggle with the realization of social justice.

The openness to accept differences starts from understanding the universal humanitarian religion. Nimer, as a figure of peace, offers a formula that beliefs today are not only framed as a source of legitimate acts of violence but as a source of peacebuilding. Intrafaith dialogue and building peace will be more effective if each intrafaith follower tries to dialogue with the community through cooperation and understanding of how to live in harmony with others. The problems in Indonesia show how political the majority in public spaces understands the narrative of pluralism. They speak of pluralism in the public sphere, but on the one hand, they use the power of the government to legitimize the marginalization of minorities. Then, intrafaith issues often become a political stage by the government to get stable support from the majority group.

Efforts to apply intrafaith dialogue to conflict situations must consider many things other than the dialogue approach because the existing problems are often politicized for the political support of several groups. Here, consensus must be present within the intrafaith community facing conflict. So that in the end, intrafaith dialogue can be used as a conflict resolution tool to prevent other violence.

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Declaration of Ownership

This article is my original work.

Conflict of Interest

There is no conflict of interest to declare in this article.

Ethical Clearance

This study was approved by the institution.

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