

SENSE AND REFERENCE

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Abstrak: Dalam semantik pengertian makna mempunyai 3 unsur pokok, makna sebagai hasil perpaduan bahasa dengan dunia di luar bahasa, adanya kesepakatan para pemakai bahasa dan dapat digunakan untuk menyampaikan informasi sehingga saling dapat memahami. Sebuah kata mempunyai konsep atau makna dan sesuatu yang dirujuk. Sebuah kata atau kalimat mungkin mempunyai satu arti saja, mempunyai lebih dari satu pengertian atau bahkan tidak mempunyai rujukan yang konkrit.

Kata Kunci : sense, reference, extension.

Introduction

Semantics is the study of the meaning of words and sentences. Meaning has generally been thought of as a relationship between words and the world. Words can be used to talk about things, and semantics is the attempt to talk about the relationship between words and things that refer to the different aspects of the meaning of a linguistic expression, they are philosophically and logically able to be connected to reference and sense terms.

Reference and sense are two principal concepts used in semantics. The distinction between sense and reference was an innovation of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in his 1892 paper *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* (Translated in English: "On Sense and Reference" by Geach and Black, 1952), which is still widely read today. According to Frege, sense and reference are two different aspects of the meaning of a linguistic expression:

- a. The reference is the object that the expression refers to. For instance, a cat.
- b. The sense is the idea or cognitive significance of the expression. For instance, the idea or word "cat".

While, sense: A way of presenting a referent. So George Bush can be presented with the expressions "George Bush", "the current president of the United States", or "the son of George Bush Sr.". These expressions are associated with three different senses of the same referent. Note that "the son of George Bush Sr." does not express a different sense than the phrase "George Bush Sr.'s son". These are two ways of expressing the same sense.

One aspect of language, namely referring, received a disproportionate amount of attention, because of its connection with truth. If truth requires correspondence between elements of language and entities in the world, and if language reflects the world, then language must attach

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to the world at certain points. Martinich states “the way that language attaches to the world is reference” (Martin, 1986: 12).

Based on the above introduction, here the writer only describes the concept of meaning in reference, sense, and providing some instances that the writer found in the daily language. By doing so, he can not only simplify the limitation of his paper problem, but also focus on the topic that he is discussing.

Discussion

a. Terminology of Sense and Reference

Historically, the term sense and reference was an innovation of the German philosopher and mathematician Gottlob Frege in his paper *Über Sinn und Bedeutung* that means on sense and reference that has prescribed in the above introduction. What is involved in the meaning of our expressions? Frege suggested that there is an aspect of an expression's meaning—the expression's sense—that is constitutively tied to the expression's role in reason and cognition. Many contemporary philosophers have argued that there is no such aspect of meaning. I think that Frege was closer to the truth: one can articulate an aspect of meaning with many, although not all, of the properties that Frege attributed to sense. This aspect of meaning is what I call an expression's epistemic intension. I will argue that epistemic intensions can serve as quasi-Fregean semantic values, and that this claim is undefeated by the major contemporary arguments against Fregean sense.

The simplest aspect of an expression's meaning is its extension. We can stipulate that the extension of a sentence is its truth-value, and that the extension of a singular term is its referent. The extension of other expressions can be seen as associated entities that contribute to the truth-value of a sentence in a manner broadly analogous to the way in which the referent of a singular term contributes to the truth-value of a sentence. In many cases, the extension of an expression will be what we intuitively think of as its referent, although this need not hold in all cases, as the case of sentences illustrates. While Frege himself is often interpreted as holding that a sentence's referent is its truth-value, this claim is counterintuitive and widely disputed. We can avoid that issue in the present framework by using the technical term 'extension'. In this context, the claim that the extension of a sentence is its truth-value is a stipulation.

Different sorts of expressions have different sorts of extensions. By the stipulation above, the extension of a singular term is an individual: the extension of 'France' is a particular country (France), and the extension of 'George W. Bush' is a particular person (Bush, Jr.). Analogously, the extension of a general term is plausibly seen as a class: the extension of 'cat' is a particular class of animals (the class of cats). The extension of a kind term can be seen as a kind: the extension of 'water' is a particular substance (water). The extension of a predicate can be seen as a property or perhaps as a class: the extension of 'hot' is

a particular property (hotness) or a particular class (the class of hot things).

The extension of a complex expression usually depends on the extensions of the simpler expressions that compose it. This applies most obviously to the truth-values of sentences. For example, 'Surabaya is in Indonesia' is true, and it is true because the extension of 'Surabaya' (a particular city) is located in the extension of 'Indonesia' (a particular country). 'Michael Jordan is short' is false, and it is false because the individual who is the extension of 'Michael Jordan' does not have the property that is the extension of 'short'.

Richard, Platt and Weber (1985: 241), sense is on the other hand, refers to the system of linguistic relationships (sense relations) which a lexical item contrast with other lexical items. According to Richard, Platt and Weber (1985: 241), it is said that: "(t)he term reference is related to the semantics, the relationships between words and the things, action, events, and qualities they stand for. For example: the relationship between the word tree and the object tree (referent) in the real world in its wider sense would be identical with denotation. In narrower sense it is used only for the relationship between linguistic expression and specific phenomena" (1985: 241)

In line opinion, Crystal (1995: 326) also prescribes that: "The term is used in philosophical linguistics and semantics for the entity object, state of affairs, etc. In the external world to which a linguistic expression relates; for example, the referent of the word table is the object of table. The term is found both as part of a two term analysis of meaning (e.g. words—things), and it can be included to three-term analyses (words – concepts – things)"

In other words, the relationship between words and things that refer to the different aspects of the meaning of a linguistic expression, they are substantially and logically able to be linked with reference and sense terms.

b. Sense and Extension

A simple and attractive view of meaning ties the meaning of an expression to its extension. On such a view (e.g., Mill 1843 in Noth 1995), the meaning of a simple term is its extension, and the meaning of a complex expression is determined by the extensions of its parts. On the strongest version of this view, the meaning of a complex expression is its extension. On a slightly weaker version, the meaning of a complex expression is a complex structure involving the extensions of the simple terms that are parts of the expression. Either way, all meaning is grounded in extension. There are three traditional reasons for doubting this simple view of meaning.

First: some simple terms (such as 'Santa Claus' and 'phlogiston') appear to lack extension. On the view above, these terms will lack meaning, or they will all have the same trivial meaning, corresponding to the null extension. But intuitively it seems clear that these terms have some meaning, and that their meanings differ from each other'. If so, then meaning is more than extension.


Second: in some sentences, the role of a word in determining a sentence's truth-value appears to go beyond its extension. This applies especially to sentences about beliefs and related matters. For example, it is plausible that 'Tono believes that Inul Daratista is a singer' could be true, while 'Tono believes that Ainur Rokhimah is a singer' is false, even though 'Inul Daratista' and 'Ainur Rokhimah' have the same extension. If so, then either the truth-value of the sentence is not determined by the meanings of the terms, or there is more to meaning than extension.

Third: there is often more than one term referring to the same thing. In such cases, the terms often seem intuitively to have different meanings. Witness 'Hesperus', the ancients' name for the evening star, and 'Phosphorus', their name for the morning star. Or take 'water' and 'H₂O', both of which refer to the same substance. If 'water' and 'H₂O' refer to the same thing, and if reference is all there is to meaning, then 'water' and 'H₂O' refer to the same thing. But intuitively, 'water' and 'H₂O' have different meanings. If that is so, then reference cannot be all there is to meaning.

c. Sense and Reference

In this part the writer wants to discuss Sukemi in his book *Semantics: A Work Book* (2000: 12-18). There are the quite distinct ways of talking about the meaning of words or other expressions. In talking Sense, we deal with the relationships inside the language.

Sense relates the complex system of relationship between one linguistic element with other linguistic elements. It deals only with intra-linguistic relations. This intra-linguistic relations can be illustrated in the following diagram:



In a sentence such as: 'Every house has got a main bedroom', there are intra-linguistic relations between one word and other words (between every and house or between has and got) or between one phrase with other phrases (between every house and has got or between has got and a main bedroom) in that sentence. Those relationships are called sense relationships (Hurford, 1990)


The relationships between language and the world, reference, deals with the relationships between the language elements (words,

phrases, and clauses) and the non-linguistic elements (the world or experience)

By means of reference, a speaker indicates which things in the world (including persons) are being talked about (Bolinger, 1987: 108)

Examples: "William Shakespeare lived in this house". "William Shakespeare" indicates a person, while "this house" indicates a thing.

Reference is a relationship between parts of a language and things outside the language. This kind of relationship can be illustrated in the following diagram:



Many expressions in a language may have variable references, such as the vice president, his wife, yang bersangkutan, dan keesokan harinya

There are cases of expressions, which in normal everyday conversations never refer to different things, such as the sun, the presidents, the black board, and tata surya kita

Two different expressions can have the same referent, such as the morning star and the evening star, the husband and wife and the couple, water and H₂O and, air keras and air raksa.

The sense of an expression is its place in a system of semantic relationship with other expressions in the language.

The pairs of words in the following sentence may have the same meaning or different meanings:

1. The flag pole doesn't seem to be quite (vertical, upright).
2. I'll be with you tomorrow (Wednesday, Thursday).
3. (Ia, dia) datang hari ini.
4. Suaminya (kadang-kadang, sering) berpergian jauh.

It is very important to remember that every expression that has meaning has sense, but not every expression has reference.

Each of the following words has sense, but none of them refers to a thing: (a) almost, (b) probable, (c) if, (d) seandainya, (e) selalu (f) Nyi Roro Kidul

We can talk about the sense, not only of the word, but also of longer expressions (phrases or sentences). Each pair in the following examples has the same sense

Examples:

1. The executive prefers educated ladies.
2. Every athlete exercises systematically. Every athlete practices his mind and body systematically.
3. Anak itu menyayangi kucing.
Anak itu sangat suka kucing.

In some cases, the same word can have more than one sense.

Examples:

1. The bank of Tokyo and The bank of Musi
2. A mug of milk and He is a mug
3. Hak asazi manusia and Hak sepatu

One sentence can have different senses too.

Examples:

1. The chicken is ready to eat.
2. He greeted the girl with a smile
3. Hak wanita Indonesia tinggi
4. Wong mati diloncati kucing urip.

There is something essentially circular about the set of definitions in a dictionary. Similarly, defining the senses of words and other expressions often has something of this circular nature. This is not necessarily a bad thing, and in any case it is often unavoidable, since in many cases there is no way of indicating the meaning of an expression except other words.

Globe – any round, ball-shaped thing; sphere.

Ball – any round, or spherical object; sphere; globe

There is something grammatically complete about a whole sentence, as opposed to a smaller expression such as a phrase or a single word. In the same way, there is semantically complete about a proposition, as opposed to the sense of a phrase or single word. Generally speaking, a proposition corresponds to a complete independent thought.

Examples:

1. Shop lifting is a crime
2. She finished her work on time
3. Penyanyi itu menikah di Bali

The three examples mentioned are propositions, while the followings are not:

1. An old friend (not understood as an elliptical sentence fragment).
2. Jane (not understand as an elliptical sentence fragment).
3. Di Bali (not understand as an elliptical sentence).

Assuming that perfect transition between languages is possible, the same sense can be said to belong to expression in different languages, such as I love you, Saya mencintai mu. and Ich liebe Dich.

d. Sense without Reference

One application Frege saw for the distinction concerns what are called nonreferring, nondenoting, or empty, expressions. These expressions do not have a reference, for example is Klenthing Kuning. Since she is a fictional character, the name of Klenthing Kuning does not appear to mean anyone at all; yet sentences like Klenthing Kuning was set down on the river are meaningful, in that they can be true or false. The question of truth would cause us to abandon aesthetic delight for an attitude of scientific investigation. Hence it is a matter of no concern to us whether the name Klenthing Kuning, for instance, has reference, so long as we accept the folklore as a work of art. It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the reference, seemingly do have meaning. Exactly which names really are empty has continued to be a matter of dispute. Some philosophers claim that sentences using empty names never express propositions while some maintain the Frege's original sense-reference distinction for names.

Conclusion

In semantic sense is usually contrasted with reference, as part of an explication of the notion of meaning. Reference or denotation, is seen as extra linguistics- the entities, and states of affairs. in the external world which a linguistics expression stands for. Sense, on the other hand, refers to the system of linguistics relationship (Richard, 1997: 347)

A term used in philosophical linguistics and semantic for the entity (object, state of affairs, etc.) in the external world to which a linguistics expression relates:

For example, the referent of the word table is the object 'table'. The term is found both as part of a two - term analysis of meaning (word - things) and in three term analysis (words - concepts - thing). Several limitations in the notion of referential meaning have been pointed out, such as several words have no obvious referents (the, should, since) and that the same referent may be referred to by several different linguistics expressions, none of which may be synonymous. (ibid, 343)

Finally, the term meaning will be used in a very broad sense, covering both of the two more specific dimension of sense (or content) and reference (object of denotatum) many semanticians, however, define the term meaning in a narrower sense which excludes the aspect of reference. The major accounts of meaning will be classified into theories of reference,

theories of sense, and connotative meanings are complementary and not rival accounts of the nature of meaning.

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