

Disguised Resistance of Madurese Salt Farming Community

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ABSTRACT

The problems of Madurese salt farmers, ranging from poverty, quality of production, low salt prices, to 'seizure' of the lands by Dutch Colonialism through the total reorganization program in 1936 as well as the project of modernization and renovation of the New Order regime in 1975 have become the triggers of the resistance put up by the salt farming community. The purpose of this article is to picture out the dynamics of the resistance by Madurese salt farming community through the theoretical analysis of James Scott, namely the daily resistance by Madurese salt farming community, which the writer -in other words- say 'disguised resistance'. The method used is qualitative with an ethnographic approach. The result is that there are two forms of disguised resistance put up by the Madurese salt farming community i.e. the resistance against PT. Garam and the resistance against the land owners.

Keywords: Resistance, Salt Farming, Salt, Madurese

INTRODUCTION

Talking about a society that has triggered social resistance, especially in Indonesia cannot be separated from the issues of resistance movements of the peasants and fishermen, which according to (Satria, 2015) have different social characteristics, where the agricultural community is categorized as an agrarian society and fishing communities as coastal communities. Farmers in many meanings are often equated with the terms of peasant and farmer. Peasant termed as farm laborers, as well as farmers who do not have agricultural land, or also farmers whose crop production is sufficient to meet the needs of themselves and their families living in rural areas (Sjaf, 2019); (Wahyudi, 2010); (Hart, 1986); (Hefner, 1990); (Scott, 1977; 1985); (Hashim, 1984); (Redfield, 1985); (Wolf, 1983); (Bernstein, 2015). While farmer is interpreted as someone who has agricultural land, and the results

of his agricultural production can meet the needs of himself and his family and also for sale (Wahyudi, 2010).

Fishermen or coastal community is a group of individuals or communities that live and inhabit a coastal area, by compiling and possessing unique cultural characteristics with their own uniqueness related to the sustainable use of coastal resources (Satria, 2009). In other words, this coastal community is not only fishermen but also fish farmers, fish processors, and fish (Satria, 2009). Thus, Coastal or fisheries communities face open resources, meaning the sea, although there are many regulations on various policies about fishing in the sea. Such an openness causes the fishermen move around to get maximum results hence it creates high risk, which in the end make the fishermen's character become hard or having no kindness feeling, firm, and open (Satria, 2015), stereotyped (Brink and Nel 2015);

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(Champion 1993); (Mooradian, 1996) to Madurese community (Taufiqurrahman, 2007); (de Jonge and Nooteboom, 2006); (de Jonge, 1991).

Meanwhile, agrarian community (farmers) face controlled resources, namely land management to be used as a commodity, so that it is relatively predictable although currently it is very difficult to predict with uncertain weather's condition, and the production process remains on the land, so business mobility is relatively low and the risk is not high (Satria, 2015).

From this definition (Satria, 2015) says that fish farmers are categorized as farmers, even though they inhabit in coastal areas. Due to the similarity of its characteristics with agrarian society, where fish farmers know the amount of the result, where, and when fish will be harvested, so that is why it is more controlled. It is in the same way with the community of salt farming (Helmi and Sasaoka, 2018), where the characteristics are almost the same as those of the agrarian society even they live in the coastal area. The availability of land or location for salt farming, the beginning of the salt farming season, and the time of the harvest as well as the prediction of the quantity of the salt harvested are some elements that can be controlled.

This problem is getting much tougher as in Madura, salt farming communities are those who inhabit agrarian site and fishermen site (coastal). So the salt farming communities in Madura are often referred to as salt farmers and fishermen. This is due to the polarization of the work that adjusts to the season (*nembara*/rainy season) and (*nemor*/dry season). This means that during the rainy season they will go out to sea for fishing or change their salt farm lands to fish ponds, and in the dry season they will become salt farmers or dryland farmers. Therefore the writer here defines the salt farming communities as salt farmers.

There have been a lot of studies on the resistance of agrarian communities and fishing communities, among them (E Wolf, 2004); (Bernstein, 2015); (Kinseng,

2014), while the resistance of farmers on a smaller scale was examined by , a study of peasant resistance in a village in Malaysia in the 1970s. Resistance of salt farming community and its effects (Fajariyah, 2016); (Rochwulaningsih, 2016); (Syafi, 2013); (Yulinda *et al.*, 2014); (Baekhaki, 2015); (Cahyaningsih, 1957); (Parwata, 1997); (Parwoto, 2018); (de Jonge, 2004) (de Jonge, 2004). (Scott, 1985) portrayed various forms of peasant's daily resistance as a result of the cumulative differentiation of social resistance to improve the living conditions of farmers, which was different from the global agrarian resistance movement. Even Scott (2000), was skeptical of the uprisings and conflicts of the global agrarian movement. This was because everyday life was indeed filled with a variety of class conflicts and battles that occasionally exploded to the surface. This means that everyday class conflicts and battles will usually be combined with or experienced with forms of oppression that have their roots in other hierarchies.

Scott (2000), points out that the variety of resistance carried out by the lower classes (farmers) in various forms of daily life, namely humor, gossip, cynicism, as well as through the roots of local wisdom traditions where those various forms of resistance are as part of a series of unrecorded history. Another form of resistance is verbal resistance which is not in formal form and not dominating. Therefore the hidden transcripts that are displayed as a form of discourse, speech, and practice are patterned outside of public transcripts, in which various practices of power are subordinated. So that the various practices of domination will always produce new forms of hidden transcripts, namely to fight against the elite and corporate. Where the resistance is in the domain of power struggles and various interests i.e. the lower class resistance to the onslaught of fake awareness and hegemony and the domination of the elite or upper class societies and corporate. According to (Scott, 1977) the conception of resistance as a concept of negation is

not only sourced from a mere material base but also has exploitative characters. There is also a character of resistance to the dominant ideology as an 'ideological counter', so that hidden transcripts are not only about mere materialistic issues, but also about the agents who create and disseminate themselves.

Furthermore, according to Scott (1977), there are three forms of hidden transcripts in the form of conceptualization of social space resistance movements, namely: 1). Hidden transcript is a product or social result of power relations between subordinates, 2). Hidden transcripts as folk culture as something that does not have a reality in pure thought whose existence is only as an extension of social practice, social articulation, and dissemination on the outside of the social stage, and 3). The social space in hidden transcripts will grow through its efforts of various kinds of resistance. These social spaces are cultural spaces such as religion, local traditions, oral expressions, humor, gossip, folklore, which serve as a form of expression of resistance and disobedience. So that the hidden transcript was born out of a need for the control and fantasy in the community. Where the control will be affected by the psychological lower class or the weak regarding oppression, humiliation, injustice and various other forms of weakness. While fantasies about power and interests are born out because of frustration and oppression which then trigger actions and expressions of resistance and likely turn into various forms of physical resistance.

Therefore according to Scott (1993), he divides the pattern of resistance in a peasant social movement, namely genuine resistance and disguised resistance. There are four characteristics of genuine resistance, namely: a). It is more organized, systematic and cooperative; b). Principled or selfless, c). Has revolutionary consequences, and d). Contains ideas or goals that negate the basis of domination. This means that resistance is not always a collective nature and the intention to survive, sometimes in the form of symbolic

resistance. While disguised resistance has characteristics, 1). Not organized, not systemic, and individual; 2). Chancy and self-interest; 3). Has no revolutionary effect; and 4). Adjusts to the dominant system that exists. The aim of resistance is not to change or oppose the system of corporate domination but to be able to survive, with the smallest loss carried out continuously, as a 'weapon of the weak' in the fight (Sajogjo, 1993) (Purwandari *et al.*, 2014).

METHODOLOGY

This research has a paradigmatic constructivism paradigm. The type of research is qualitative. While the methodological basis of this research is to use an ethnographic approach. In this research, the data collection was extracted from primary data sources and secondary data. Where primary data were collected through participant observation and through structured interviews and unstructured interviews of researchers, as well as using focus group discussions (FGD) to each element of research actors. Whereas secondary data were obtained from official documents or available literature and from general mass media reports, journals, books, papers, and research reports that were relevant and related to the research topic. The data analyses use data reduction, data presentation, and drawing conclusion (Miles *et al.*, 1992). This research was carried out in Madura precisely in Sumenep Regency, Pinggir Papas Village, Kalianget District and Gersik Putih Village, Gapura District from August 2018 to January 2019.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

The monopoly on production and control of the salt farming community's lands, the relocation of settlements and people's lands, and the conversion of agricultural and coastal lands into collateral land have been the triggers of the resistance movement by the Madurese salt farming community (Pinggir Papas and Gresik Putih Village). The dynamics of the resistance

of the salt farming community that has arisen since the beginning of the formation of the social structure of the people in Pinggir Papan (the warriors of the Balinese Kingdom who lost the war), then during the Dutch colonial rule by refusing the sale of 'rental' of the farmers' salt lands to the Dutch colony which had an impact on the exile of the farmers to '*grugut*', as well as the resistance to the independence of the Republic of Indonesia are the series of resistance from the Madurese salt farming community.

The portrait of Madurese salt farming communities which will be portrayed and analyzed through the theory of Scott (1985; 1993), is disguised resistance (incidental).

Daily Resistance (Incidental) of Salt Farming Community

Disguised resistance Scott (1986; 1993), refers to it as incidental resistance, which is characterized by resistance that is not organized, not systemic, and is individual in nature; the resistance is chancy and self-interest; the resistance has no revolutionary impact; and adjusts to the existing system of domination. The daily resistance does not change or oppose the system of corporate domination (PT. Garam), but as a form of survival by minimizing the smallest losses by continuous action as a form of 'weapon of the weak' (Sajogjo, 1993).

This disguised resistance is a form of 'rebellion' that tends to be soft, introverted and not confrontational, but takes place continuously in a variety of daily activities, and even tends to avoid and vague in the resistance (Scott, 1993; Scott, 2000; Rochwulaningsih 2016).

Talking about the disguised resistance of the Madurese salt farming community cannot be separated from the social entity of the community. Madurese salt farming community is not a homogeneous entity, because many social groups that are part of the salt farming community, starting from PT. Garam, in which there are organic employees (BUMN employees), PKWT (certain time work agreement), outsourcing, seasonal


daily workers, daily workers, and contract workers. Seasonal daily laborers, casual daily laborers, and contract workers are those who work to make salt in PT. Garam, transport the results of salt collection for the drying process, and transport salt to be stored in a warehouse. Whereas salt farming people is a social group that involves salt land owners (*talangan*), salt land tenants (production sharing systems), salt collectors (using motorbike) transport workers, and daily labor collectors. It can be said that there are two forms of disguised resistance i.e. the resistance to PT. Garam and the resistance to the land owners (Figure 1).

Disguised Resistance against PT. Garam

PT. Garam as an institution in the form of BUMN (State-Owned Enterprise), which deals with salt farming, has a variety of group entities involved in it. Where each of these entities will have a variety of different interests, and each group of social entities in PT. Garam consists of certain social classes with different positions, roles, and social status.

Organic employees, which consist of permanent BUMN employees with much better welfare guarantee than other groups of employees, especially seasonal daily freelancers and piece-work employees, will certainly lead to very large potential conflicts. Organic employees are employees who live in around the office facilitated with cold room (AC) and with a variety of infrastructure facilities as well as periodic increase in income. Whereas seasonal daily employees, day-to-day employees and piece-work employees are actually employees who are salt-making laborers. They are in salt farm land exposed to very hot weather without any infrastructure, even they sometimes find difficulty to have breaks, for example for lunch and prayer. In addition, there is no guarantee of periodic wage increases.

These differences of position, status, and role have caused various resistances carried out by seasonal daily



Source: Primary Data Processed, 2019

Figure 1

Patterns of Disguised Resistance of the Madurese Salt farming Community

employees, daily employees, and piece-work employees towards PT. Garam. The strong domination of PT. Garam towards its employees (especially seasonal daily employees, daily employees, and piece-work employees) have caused the employees tend to fight in vague and non-confrontational ways but continues.

This is a weapon of resistance of seasonal daily employees, day-to-day employees, and piece-work employees to carry out resistance as part of the weapons of the weak (Sajogjo, 1993). The Strong dominance of PT. Garam causes the work patterns at PT. Garam very exploitative. This means that seasonal daily employees, day-to-day employees, and piece-work employees are forced to work with the salt production target adjusted to the target made by PT. Garam and the Government. Increasing salt production targets each year, with or without taking into account the weather and conditions of the employees (seasonal daily, daily, and piece-work employees), as well as the welfare level of the employees causing non-confrontational

disguised resistance but carried out continuously is the most suitable step for the employees of PT. Garam. The kinds of resistances are as follow:

a. Delaying the Harvest

Seasonal daily employees are those who are employed by PT. Garam every salt production season (*nemor* season) consisting of *pantong* and *antik*. *Pantong* are the leaders in the process of salt making assisted by *antik*. Each *pantong* is responsible for the process of making salt in an area of 1 *vak* or about \pm 10 hectares (ha), assisted by *antik*.

In addition to being given the responsibility of making quality salt with a production target of around 70-100 tons per 1 hectare (ha) of plastered land at PT. Garam, they are also given the responsibility to carry the results of the collection of salt from the land to reach the edge of the road (drying process). The weight of the work for *pantong* and *antik* with wages or fees that are only adjusted to the Regency Minimum Wage (UMK) standard of

Sumenep Regency is 1.8 million, paid four times with every Saturday paid 450,000. The low payment for *pantong* and *antik* and the increase in work for them (carrying picked up salt) causes *pantong* and *antik* to 'disguisedly' resist against PT. Garam by 'pouring sea water into a crystal bail that is ready to be picked up'. By pouring sea water into the salt processing land that is ready to be collected, causing a temporary salt harvest failure. This is done so to make a break for them to pick up salt. This pause is done because the *pantong* and *antik* usually also work for other land owners' land. Working in the same two jobs is one of the ways by which the salt farmers can survive, especially in *nemabara*'s season or in the season when salt is not produced (rainy season).

For *pantong* and *antik*, by thwarting the harvest of salt for a while, around 1-2 days is one form of 'disguised' resistance against PT. Garam. By doing so, *pantong* or *antik* then work for other people's salt farming lands. However, thwarting the collection of salt in thousand hectares land area of PT. Garam will not cause the failure of the annual production target of PT. Garam and government.

In addition, *pantong* and *antik* do not get health insurance from PT. Garam, even *pantong* and *antik* do not know their rights as they are seasonal daily employees, daily employees, or piece workers. This is because these employees have never been given employment contracts as the employees officially recruited by PT. Garam. In fact, according to a *pantong* who has been working for decades and even since the Dutch era, his rights are still the same and unchanged; getting paid every week (i.e. Saturday) and getting the right to manage the farm lands in the '*nembara*' (rainy season) to make fish ponds. The right to manage the farm land to serve as fish ponds is as an effort to bind the *pantong* so that they will not work for others but in Salt farming.

The age of *pantong*, which is quite old, around 45-60 years old and *antik*, aged 40-50 years, causes their physical strength

become more vulnerable, often causing them to be tired and sick. To carry this very heavy burden, usually *pantong* and *antik* also become cultivators with a profit-sharing system on the people's salt farm lands. The pattern of this sharing system varies in pattern, some are called *partelon* (one third) system or also *parleman* (one fifth) system however, the majority of profit-sharing system in the Madurese community is *partelon* system.

The high domination and exploitation by PT. Garam causes very high solidarity among *pantong* and *antik* often they help one another, especially to carry the salt collected from the salt collection in each area of *pantong*. In addition, they also help each other when one of the *pantong* or *antik* face disaster, suffer illness, or even death.

It turns out that PT. Garam actually realizes what is done by *pantong* and *antik* in thwarting salt harvests temporarily by inserting *ngude* water in salt crystal fields that will be collected. According to the director of PT. Garam, they do it actually as a form of protest of the workers to always be cared about, especially related to their welfare. The organic employees of PT. Garam should not only be based in an air-conditioned room, but it needs to be part of seasonal daily employees, daily employees, and contract workers who work at the salt farms with heat and sweat. This resistance has been done for a long time even according to PT. Garam, it has been carried out since the salt modernization project, the New Order era or around 1975's. Actually, PT. Garam has cared about the seasonal daily employees, daily employees, and contract workers by providing medical drugs, providing nine primary staple food, and healthy drinks (milk), even the leaders in each salt-farming occasionally have jokes with seasonal daily employees, daily employees and contract workers at salt farm lands to get excited together. The attention paid by PT. Garam is to minimize or control the resistance intended to temporarily thwart the salt harvest.

b. Flowing Seawater of PT. Garam

In the process of producing salt, seawater is the main and very important raw material. The quality of seawater affects the quality of the salt produced. Therefore, to flow seawater into reservoirs with a quality standard of around 3.5° Be and to the present land to get standards of up to 25-27° Be to LAT to salt crystal tables require adequate technological tools.

The Madurese salt farming community has been using windmills and *sengguden* to lift seawater and put it into the farm lands and release LAT onto the crystal table. This method is very simple and has been used for a very long time since the era of Raden Anggasuto (around XVI century) and remains the same with no technological innovation created by the Madurese salt farming community. *Sengguden* which is operated manually requires a rather long time process, thus hampering the time of the salt production process. The weak technological innovation in the salt farming community is due to their strong belief in the historical knowledge they got from their predecessors in producing salt. This is what makes it hard for the people of salt farming to compete both in the quantity and the quality of salt production with PT. Garam let alone the limited number of the farm lands. This uncompetitive quantity and quality of the people's salt product towards PT. Garam causes many (private) companies prefer buying salt from PT. Garam to the people's salt product.

This matter causes the 'disguised' resistance done by Madurese salt farming community, especially those who work for the people's salt farm land. Resistance without confrontation that they do as a form to raise the quality and quantity of people's salt production. Innovations done by PT. Garam as a legacy of Dutch colonialism with its salt irrigation system and pumping machines to suck and dispose of seawater concentrated 5 – 20 be (*ngude*) and seawater concentrated 25 – 35 be (*tua*) to the present lands and to the crystal table has led to the high quantity and quality of PT. Garam rather than the results of

people's salt production. Water pipes from the salt processing pond to the crystal table are often flowed to the people's salt farm land. This is done as an effort to accelerate the production and increase the quantity and quality of the salt.

The taking of seawater with concentrate of 25 – 35 be by the cultivator of people's salt farm land is a form of protest they put up against PT. Garam when the amount of salt production increases sharply, and the quality of the salt is also better than those of the production of the people's salt farm. The attempt to inhibit or reduce the quantity of salt production of PT. Garam is one of the reasons why people working in the people's salt farm steal seawater (concentrated around 25 to 35 be) from the irrigation process of PT. Garam. By accelerating the process of LAT to the people's salt farm crystal table, is a way to increase the amount of people's salt production. Increasing the amount of people's salt production by speeding up the production process and increasing the quality of the production of salt, then doing 'deliberate theft' of the seawater irrigation pipes of PT. Garam to be channeled to the people's salt farm land is a form of resistance carried out by the salt farming community.

The rivalry between PT. Garam and people's salt production to sell their products to (private) companies is one of the factors causing daily resistance leads to the theft of old seawater of PT. Garam. Another problem arises when PT. Garam buys the product from the people's salt farming because the amount of production that is increasing also becomes the trigger this 'disguised' resistance. In addition to the factors regarding the demand for salt quality, the standards are getting higher, especially for industrial salt, which is at least 95% NHCL. Weak technological innovation and not having achieved the quality standards of salt produced by the people's salt farming land, causing the salt produced by the people's salt farm can only be used as consumption salt. The need for consumption salt that is not as big as

the requirement for industrial salt results in a drop in consumption salt prices (the results of the production of the people's salt farming).

The 'disguised' resistance of the people working on the salt farming land of the people by deliberate theft of irrigation and the seawater pipelines owned by PT. Garam is also mostly done by *pantong* or *antik* who work on the lands of PT. Garam. The *pantong* and *antik* that produce the salts of PT. Garam on the lands of PT. Garam possess very good knowledge, especially related to irrigation and the stages of seawater pipes owned by PT. Garam before adding to crystal tables. This knowledge is imitated by *pantong* or *antik* for theft, and is usually carried out at the same time as the LAT irrigation to the crystal tables of PT. Garam and to those of the people's salt farm. It is seldom or even no control from the employees of PT. Garam, especially its organic employees and their leaders, to the salt farming lands. Such a condition makes it easier for the people working on salt farm land and the *pantong* and *antik* who work on the people's salt farm land to commit thefts as 'disguised resistance' of the people of the salt farmers.

This resistance is very beneficial for the people who are in the vicinity of PT. Garam because it will speed up the process of theft or removal of the seawater pipes of PT. Garam to the people's salt farm land, so that the impact on increasing the quantity and quality of the production of salt. In addition, it can also minimize the area of the phasing stage, especially not using a reservoir or even the salt processing pool I and II, because it already utilizes *ngude* (seawater concentrated 5 –20 be) and *tua* seawater concentrated around 23 – 35 be from irrigation of PT. Garam. So that the landowners usually only prepare the salt processing pool III and lands for the crystal table only.

2. Resistance against the Owner of the Salt Processing Land

Social groups and community entities of

people's salt farming community covers various social group entities, namely land owners, cultivator (profit sharing), salt harvest labor, *droeffplat* labor (*labor who dries salt in the sun on the side of street and sacks it*), and salt transport workers. As the differences of the social group entities become more varied, it makes the complexity of 'disguised resistance' among the salt farming community in Madura diverse and complex.

The differences in interests among social group entities involved in the Madurese salt farming community have led to more diverse conflicts between group entities in the Madurese salt farming community, both among land owners, tenants, and laborers. Although, the 'disguised resistance' that occurred among the owner of the salt farm land with the workers as well as with the cultivators of the salt farming land. This resistance occurred because the owners of the salt farm land have never cared about the welfare of the tenants and the workers. The owners of the salt farm land tend to only think about the profitability of their salt production, it turns out that many aid programs are taken and utilized by the farm land owners neglecting the employees of the farm land or their workers. For example, funding assistance for the 2012 'People's Salt Empowerment' (PUGAR) program of around Rp 50,000,000, or geomembrane assistance for crystal tables was sold by the land owners. This is the trigger of 'disguised resistance' carried out by the people working on the salt farm land and the salt workers, including:

a. Lowering the Quality of Salt

The high increase of demands to make the quality of salt better, especially to meet the needs of industrial salt is at utmost importance in salt production. The high standard of salt quality for industrial salt needs has made Madurese salt farming community be more innovative and creative in developing salt production process technology.

In fact, the people produce un-

competitive salt however they are reluctant to change the paradigm of the salt making style based on their traditional knowledge to innovative technologies in producing salt for industry.

For the Madurese salt farmers community, salt making does not require a variety of technological innovations as for them the salt production they make can produce the best salt of any type, such as the results they get from Dutch production, for the Madurese salt farming community, salt collection on top of the salt style of the Dutch period will produce the best quality salt.

The absence of innovation and a touch of modern technology in the process of salt production is actually not only due to the difficulty or unwillingness of the Madurese community (salt farmers) of the salt farming land to change the paradigm of traditional knowledge culture, but because of the burden of the cost of developing technological innovations that will burden the salt farming cultivators not the landowners. For example, when the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (KKP) through the Sumenep Regency Fisheries Service provided geomembrane assistance to the people's salt farm land through the PUGAR program, the salt farm land owner sold it to other land owners and then the proceeds of the sale were taken by the owner of the farm land. For the needs of geomembrane on their own salt farm land, the land owner buys a new geomembrane and is part of the salt production sharing process (ie the cost of producing salt). This results in lessening the salt production that will be obtained by the salt farmers with the sharing system of revenue sharing *partelon* (1/3) and *parleman* (1/5). The high price of geomembrane and a variety of innovation technologies causes the traditional salt farmers reluctant to create a variety of innovations in the process of salt production. This is because the burden of technological innovation costs imposed on the salt farmers are also none of the land owner's responsibility, thus further reducing the income of the salt farmers.

The salt farm land owners who tend to treat the salt farmer sun fairly especially in the profit sharing, it causes the pattern of relationship between the owners of the salt farm land with the salt farmers is very exploitative. The unfair profit sharing that often causes injustice and exploitation of the owner of the salt farm land against the tenants causes disguised conflict between the two. Resistance made by salt farmers is a resistance that is not confrontational and tends to be undercover but done continuously in the process of salt production in the salt farm land.

The pattern of the relationship between the owner of the salt farm land and the workers is only during the process of salt making. The sale of salt production and profit sharing are entirely the authority of the owner of the land. The helplessness over the dominance of the land owners over the salt farmers is a portrait of the weak bargaining position of the salt farmers, due to the powerless salt farming community to free themselves from the work of salt making. The inability of the salt farmers to get out of the economic structure outside of salt farming land make the the salt farmers depend themselves on making salt as a source of living for his family.

The incapable and powerless salt farmers to increase their bargaining position towards the land owners do not automatically free the conflict between them. The lack of courage to take up confrontational resistance is the cause of the farmers to take up disguised resistance; through lowering the salt quality.

The salt workers who have authority in making salt production can determine the quality and quantity of the salt produced. This authoritative right is used as the main 'weapon' of resistance by the salt workers who work on salt farm land. The man power and expertise of the salt workers in producing salt are considered to have no value or meaning for the owners of the salt farm land. This means that the expertise and power of the salt workers to produce salt is considered to have no important value for the land owners (Rochwulaningsih, 2016).

The meaninglessness and worthlessness of the man power and expertise of the salt workers in the perspective of the land owners cause the salt makers to degrade the quality of salt. Because the results of the production of quality-standard salt does not have positive impact on economic consequences for the workers. This means that even though the production results are of high quality salt, the profit sharing remains the same or unfair. So that the salt workers will accelerate the collection of salt without considering the quality of the salt produced. Increasing the quantity of salt production to multiply the revenue share for the sale of salt production is the only step that can be done by the salt workers. The salt workers tend not to care about the quality of salt “even though they can make qualified salt”, because the economic impact is not too significant for the salt workers, and even tends to cause financial loss.

The making of high-quality salt that requires a minimum time of approximately 10 days to collect salt since the release of the seawater (concentrated 25 to 35 Be) will have an impact on the low quantity of salt produced. So that many salt workers harvest the salt earlier with only about 4-7 days since the seawater release. The high quantity of salt production will have a significant impact on the salt workers, but not for the salt farm land owners, even it will cause financial loss due to low price and the difficulty in finding a buyers; both private companies and PT. Garam.

Through putting forward the salt harvest and increasing the quantity of the salt, the salt workers will get the money from their effort earlier as well. The financial need obtained from the salt production to support family is the main reason for putting forward the salt harvesting although it puts aside the salt quality. The ignorance of the quality of salt by the salt workers is a form of ‘disguised’ resistance and is not confrontational. This is done because they have no ability and bargaining power towards the land owners. The physical power and expertise possessed by the salt

workers are meaningless; these have no bargaining power to increase the economic bargaining value towards the owners of the farm land. The authority and exploitation by the salt farm land owners in dealing with a ‘cooperation agreement’ for profit sharing that tends to ‘handcuff’ the salt workers will create subordination in salt farming land employees. Profit sharing with one-third and one-fifth systems (*partelon* and *parleman*) is actually only a form of physical exploitation of a cooperation done by land owners to salt workers.

b. Putting Droefferplat Salt into Sacks Excessively

Transporting salt from crystal tables to drying process (on street side) or in Dutch *droefferplat* to facilitate the transportation of salt to warehouses or sales to companies is the next stage when the salt collection is complete. When it has been piled up on the side of a street for about 2-3 days (dried up), then the next step is to put salt into the sacks provided by the buyers or companies. The transportation of salt from crystal tables to drying is usually carried out by day laborers using *pekolan* (traditional carrier tool) with two containers or *renjing* at both ends as the places of salt. After 2-3 days on the side of the street and dry, then put into a sack that is usually done by women whose husbands work as salt workers. The wage for daily workers to transport the salt using *pekolan* with two containers or *renjing* to the drying place (street-side) is Rp 50,000 per day, plus lunch and cigarettes, as well as coffee, while the wives who put salt into the sack are paid only Rp 1.000 each sack.

The wage for carrying salt which is of only Rp 50,000 per day and Rp 1,000 per sack for putting the salt into sacks and extra gifts provided by the owner of salt farming land, such as lunch, cigarettes, and coffee give significant effect to the workers in the salt production. Daily workers including the salt farm land workers are usually the ‘coordinators’ of the day laborers in transporting and putting salt into sacks. Here, the care of salt farm land owners is

needed to encourage the day laborers. It means that the food menu, cigarette brand, and various drinks provided will affect the work of the day laborers.

The obedience and poverty of the day workers consequently force them to keep working with the low wage standard determined by the owners of the salt farm land. The incapability of daily workers to work outside salt farming land forces them to accept the consequence of the wage they will receive. However, the low wage and the helplessness of day laborers do not mean that transport workers and those who put salt into sacks remain powerless. The day laborers carry out 'disguised resistance', not confrontational but carried out continuously.

In doing the resistances, the day laborers will not do their job well and neglecting the quantity of the salt transported and put into the sacks. The transporters and women who put salt into sacks are actually able to collect 2-3 tons salt each day, but they work lazily and can only transport or collect 1 ton of salt in one day. Working lazily and inappropriately is a form of resistance towards the salt farm land owner, which is done in vague and not confrontational. The land owners who do not care about the day laborers are the cause of the resistance although the resistance is not confrontational.

The parsimonious land owners in giving food, cigarettes, or drinks to the day laborers (transporting salt to the sun dry and putting the salt into the sacks) has also caused resistance put up by the workers. Besides working lazily, the workers will also put excessive amount of salt into the sack intentionally. This because of the salt trading process, the purchase of salt is not weighed in the same way as what PT. Garam do but through measurements as it has been used since the Dutch colonialism period, namely for large sacks \pm 60-70 kg, the amount of 1 ton is equalized with 20 sacks, and sack size \pm 45-55 kg, the amount of 1 ton is equalized with 25 sacks.

By putting salt into the sack excessively and not weighing but using

only estimation instead, the laborers put up resistance as a form of a fight against injustice and authoritarianism of the land owners in determining the wage unilaterally. Efforts to minimize the profits of the owners of the salt farm land by putting excessive salt into sacks is a form of disguised resistance put up by salt daily workers. The stingy and lack of empathy of the salt farm land owners towards the salt daily laborers has triggered 'disguised resistance' but not confrontational by these salt daily workers. The 'ingratitude' of the owners of the farm land who take benefit from the workers without any expenses or laboring over and only with the ownership of salt lands, for the workers is an attitude of selfish and less humane. These are the attitudes that trigger the daily, disguised, and non-confrontational resistances put up by the salt daily laborers (salt transporters to sun dry places and laborers who put salt into sacks).

c. Taking Salt Product (Motorcycle Transport)

Having been put into the sacks provided, the salt is transported by motorcycle to the roadside or streets usually passed by salt transporter trucks of the buyers. These salt transporters are daily laborers who are usually employed after the salt collection is finished, the salt has been sun-dried and put into sacks.

Motorcycle with the driver's skill in driving it is one of the modes of transportation that the salt carriers must possess. The difficult terrain and with three sacks of salt carried on the motorbike portray the daily activities of the salt carriers. Usually, the laborers of salt transport come from outside the salt farm land areas. They are from the neighbor villages of the salt producing village although the villages are still within the same sub-district. These daily workers usually do their job in groups of 3 to 5 working for the owner of salt farm land who has hired them to carry salt product with motorcycle.

The salt farm land owners whose salt products have been put into sacks usually

ask the groups of salt carriers to carry the salt products to side-road, in order to make it easier for the company's trucks to load the salt. After carrying the salt to the side-road by motorcycle, these workers also load the salt onto the trucks to be delivered to the buying companies.

The wage of sacked salt transporting by motorcycle is diverse; it depends on the distance covered from the sun-drying places. The wages of sacked salt transport laborers starts start from Rp 2.000 to Rp 5.000 per sack depends on the distance covered. Transporting sacked salt by motorcycle began in 2010s, previously the workers used to carry sacked salt by bicycle or carrying the salt on the shoulders with traditional tool. The wages of transport workers have a fixed standard, meaning that low or high prices of salt do not affect the wage paid as in 2018 when the salt price was high; about Rp 2,000,000 – Rp 3,500,000 / ton and in 2019 when the price of salt is very cheap, namely Rp 250,000 – Rp 450,000 / ton the price of wage transport workers remains in the range of Rp 2,000 – Rp 5,000 / sack.

When the price of salt is falling this year, the income of transport workers is quite higher compared with the income of the workers of salt farm land, so that sometimes there comes jealousy among the workers who work on salt farm land, daily laborers carrying salt to the sun-dry palaces. The salt farm workers' wage is often reduced by the owner of the land when the salt price is dropped, but the wage is never added when the price of salt is very high. Even the owners of the land sometimes have objection to the wage standardized by the sacked salt transporter group. But for the sacked salt motorcycle transporters, the wage has never increased even since they still used bicycle transportation around the 1970s. The increase of wage should be made because motorcycle maintenance and gasoline costs for transportation operation are never provided by the owner of the salt farm land. This is different from bicycle that does not require any cost but physical

power instead.

This problem is the main basis of the non-confrontative resistance put up by the salt transporters against the owners of salt farm land. The motorcycles that are quickly rusty and damaged due to contact with seawater and salt as well as the cost of gasoline that are never reimbursed or cared of by the land owner cause the transporters to put up 'disguised resistance' by 'stealing intentionally', 1-2 sacks of salt every day when they go home (in the afternoon before sunset) from transporting salt to the highway.

For motorbike sacked salt transporters, stealing 1-2 sacked salt every day is as part of the reimbursement for motorcycle maintenance cost and gasoline in the process of transporting sacked salt. This intentional theft is a form of protest or resistance carried out in disguised or non-confrontational ways with the land owners. The 2,000 - 5,000 rupiahs wage are actually the wages for the laborers' physical works in transporting salt by motorcycle, while the wage for the means of transportation (motorcycle) is considered to be the same as the previous conveyance, namely bicycle and pickup tool and *renjhing*. Therefore, the theft done by the salt carriers is part of the protest against the land owners in disguised and non-confrontational ways.

CONCLUSION

The 'disguised' resistance put up by Madurese salt farming community is a form of protest carried out by salt farming community due to the domination, hegemony, and injustice done by PT. Garam and the salt farm land owners. This resistance is in the form 'the weakest weapon' put up by salt farming community. The disguised resistance, non-confrontative but frequently and continuously carried out is an effort of Madurese salt farming community to get out of the oppression and powerlessness as well as injustice done by PT. Garam and the salt farm land owners. The disguised resistance of Madurese salt farming community is portrayed in two forms namely 1). Resistance against PT.

Garam, in the form of temporarily thwarting the production of salt by flowing *ngude* or seawater with concentration of 5 - 25 be to a salt farm land that would be harvested and taking seawater with concentration of 23 – 25 be from PT. Garam through the irrigation pipeline flowed to the people's salt farm land; and 2). Resistance against the salt farm land owner, among the resistances are lowering the quality of salt, hoarding or put salt excessively into sacks and working lazily and carelessly, then taking 1-2 sacks of salt in each salt transportation process committed by motorcycle transport workers.

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